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The universal composability (UC) framework is the established standard for analyzing
cryptographic protocols in a modular way, such that security is preserved under concurrent
composition with arbitrary other protocols. However, although UC is widely used for on-
paper proofs, prior attempts at systemizing it have fallen short, either by using a symbolic
model (thereby ruling out computational reduction proofs), or by limiting its expressiveness.
In this thesis, we lay the groundwork for building a concrete, executable implementation
of the UC framework. Our main contribution is a process calculus, dubbed the Interactive
Lambda Calculus (ILC). ILC faithfully captures the computational model underlying UC—
interactive Turing machines (ITMs)—by adapting ITMs to a subset of the π-calculus through
an affine typing discipline. In other words, well-typed ILC programs are expressible as ITMs.
In turn, ILC’s strong confluence property enables reasoning about cryptographic security
reductions. We use ILC to develop a simplified implementation of UC called SaUCy.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In cryptography, a proof of security in the simulation-based universal composability (UC)
framework is considered the gold standard for demonstrating that a protocol “does its job se-
curely” [1]. In particular, a UC-secure protocol enjoys the strongest notion of compositionality—
it maintains all security properties even when run concurrently with arbitrary other protocol
instances. This is in contrast with weaker property-based notions that only guarantee secu-
rity in a standalone setting [2] or under sequential composition [3]. Thus, the benefit of using
UC is modularity—it supports analyzing complex protocols by composing simpler building
blocks. However, the cost of using UC is that security proofs tend to be quite complicated.
We believe that applying a formal systemization to UC can help simplify its use, bring new
clarity, and provide useful tooling. We envision a future where modularity of cryptographic
protocol composition translates to modular implementation as well.
Reviewing prior efforts of applying formal techniques to cryptography, we find they run
up against challenges when importing the existing body of UC theory. Either they do not
support computational reasoning (which considers issues of probability and computational
complexity) [4], do not support message-passing concurrency for distributed protocols [5],
or are too expressive (allow for expressing nondeterminism with no computational interpre-
tation) [6].
Our observation is that these approaches diverge from UC at a low level: UC is de-
fined atop the underlying (concurrent) computational model of interactive Turing machines
(ITMs). The significance of ITMs is that they have a clear computational interpretation, so
it is straightforward to relate execution traces to a probabilistic polynomial time computa-
tion, as is necessary for cryptographic reduction proofs. The presence of (non-probabilistic)
nondeterminism in alternative models of concurrency would frustrate such reduction proofs.
ITMs sidestep this issue by having a deterministic (modulo random coin tosses), “single-
threaded” execution semantics. That is, processes pass control from one to another each
time a message is sent so that exactly one process is active at any given time, and, moreover,
the order of activations is fully determined.
In this thesis, we take up the challenge of faithfully capturing these idioms by designing a
new process calculus called the Interactive Lambda Calculus (ILC), which adapts ITMs to
a subset of the π-calculus [7] through an affine typing discipline. In other words, well-typed
ILC programs are expressible as ITMs. We then use ILC to build a concrete, executable
implementation of a simplified UC framework, dubbed SaUCy.
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CHAPTER 2: PRELIMINARIES
This chapter provides sufficient background on the UC framework needed to understand
this thesis. For a more in-depth treatment of the simulation-based security paradigm (upon
which the UC framework is based), we refer readers to Lindell’s tutorial [8]. For a compre-
hensive treatment of UC, we refer readers to Canetti’s paper [1].
2.1 SIMULATION-BASED SECURITY
Security proofs in the UC framework follow the simulation-based security paradigm, also
known as the real/ideal paradigm [3]. In UC, an environment Z hands inputs to protocol
parties and receives their outputs. Intuitively, Z represents the external environment con-
sisting of arbitrary protocol executions that may be running concurrently with the protocol
in consideration. In the real world, honest parties execute a protocol π over a network
controlled by an adversary A, who can corrupt (and thus control) parties while freely com-
municating with Z. In the ideal world, honest parties and an incorruptible, trusted party F
called an ideal functionality together execute an idealized protocol ρ. More specifically, the
honest parties of ρ are “dummy parties” who directly forward their inputs to F ; the ideal
functionality F internally performs the desired cryptographic task and generates outputs
for the honest parties. Intuitively, the ideal protocol ρ is secure by construction, and the
security requirements of the task are captured via the instructions of the ideal functionality
F .
Informally, we say that a protocol π securely realizes an ideal functionality F if the real
world is as secure as the ideal world. The proof follows a standard rhythm: For every
adversary A attacking the real world, we need to show there exists a simulator S that
performs an equivalent attack on the ideal world. As there are no meaningful attacks on the
ideal world (F is secure by construction), it follows that there are no meaningful attacks on
the real world (π is secure). This can be stated a bit more precisely as follows.
Definition 2.1 (UC-realizes). A protocol π UC-realizes an ideal functionality F if for every
probabilistic polynomial time (p.p.t.) adversary A there exists a p.p.t simulator S such that
no p.p.t. environment Z can distinguish the real world (with π and A) from the ideal world
(with F and S).
A few remarks are in order. First, in the context of computational security, we are only
interested in computationaly bounded adversaries, i.e., adversaries whose running time is
polynomial in some security parameter. Second, we should be a bit more precise about
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what it means for the real world and ideal world to be indistinguishable to an environment.
Let execπ,A,Z(z) denote the random variable (over the local random choices of all involved
machines) describing the output of an execution of π with environment Z and adversary S,
on input z ∈ {0, 1}∗. Let execπ,A,Z denote the ensemble {execπ,A,Z(z)}z∈{0,1}∗ . By “real
world and ideal world being indistinguishable,” we mean that the ensembles execπ,A,Z and
execρ,S,Z are indistinguishable, where ρ is the ideal protocol for F . That is, for any input,
the probability that Z outputs 1 in the real world differs by at most a negligible amount
from the probability that Z outputs 1 in the ideal world.
2.2 UNIVERSAL COMPOSITION
The UC framework comes with a composition theorem, which provides composability
guarantees for protocols proven secure in the framework. Let π1 be a protocol that securely
realizes a functionality F1. If a protocol π2, using the functionality F1 as a subroutine,
securely realizes a functionality F2, then the composed protocol ππ1/F12 , where calls to F1
are replaced by calls to π1, securely realizes F2. Therefore, it suffices to analyze the security
of the simpler protocol π2 in the F1-hybrid model, where the parties run π2 with access
to the ideal functionality F1. Thus, π2 behaves just like the ideal functionality F2, even
when composed concurrently with an arbitrary protocol π1 and when using the protocol as
a building block for more advanced protocols.
2.3 EXECUTION MODEL
The entities taking part in protocol executions (protocol machines, functionalities, ad-
versaries, and environments) are described as interactive Turing machines (ITMs). The
execution of a system of ITMs is initiated by the environment, which provides input to and
obtains output from the protocol machines, and also communicates with the adversary. The
adversary has access to the ideal functionalities in the hybrid models, in some models it
also serves as a network among the protocol machines. Throughout the execution, ITMs are
activated one-by-one, where the exact order of the activations depends on the considered
model. Processes pass control from one to another each time a message is sent so that ex-
actly one process is active at any given time, and, moreover, the order of activations is fully
determined. This gives ITMs a clear computational interpretation, which is necessary for
the above proofs (in particular, cryptographic reductions) to go through.
One might wonder whether this simplistic, seemingly sequential model of computation ad-
3
equately represents concurrent computation. Traditional models of concurrent computation
permit arbitrary (nondeterministic) interleavings of local, atomic operations performed by
processes (subject to causality constraints). In this setting, the granularity of atomic events
is a key factor in determining the level of concurrency under consideration, and thus the
expressive power of the model. In the UC setting, instead of determining the granularity
of atomic events in advance and then considering all possible interleavings of these events,
ITMs let processes themselves determine both the granularity of atomic events (by decid-
ing when to send a message to another machine) and the specific interleaving of events (by
deciding which machine to send a message to). Arbitrary and adversarial interleaving of
events is captured by including in the system explicit adversarial processes that represent
the variability in timing and ordering of events. Moreover, the ability to restrict atten-
tion to computationally bounded scheduling of events—as opposed to fully nondeterministic
scheduling—is crucial for establishing computational security guarantees.
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CHAPTER 3: INTERACTIVE LAMBDA CALCULUS
Why do we need another process calculus in the first place? Where do existing ones fall
short? On the one hand, process calculi such as the π-calculus [7] and its cryptography-
oriented variants [6, 9, 10] are not a good fit to ITMs, since they permit non-confluent
reductions by design (i.e., non-probabilistic nondeterminism). On the other hand, various
other calculi that do enjoy confluence are overly restrictive, only allowing for fixed or two-
party communications [11, 4, 12].
ILC fills this gap by adapting ITMs to a subset of the π-calculus through an affine typing
discipline. That is, resources designated as affine are non-duplicable. To maintain that only
one process is active (can write) at any given time, processes implicitly pass around an affine
write token w by virtue of where they perform read and write effects: When process A
writes to process B, process A “spends” the write token and process B “earns” the write
token. Moreover, to maintain that the order of activations is fully determined, the read
endpoints of channels are affine resources, and so each write operation corresponds to a
single, unique read operation. Together, these give ILC its central metatheoretic property
of confluence.
The importance of confluence is that the only nondeterminism in an ILC program is due
to random coin tosses taken by processes, which have a well-defined distribution. Addi-
tionally, any apparent concurrency hazards, such as adversarial scheduling of messages in
an asynchronous network, are due to an explicit adversary process rather than uncertainty
built into the model itself. This eliminates non-probabilistic nondeterminism, and so ILC
programs are amenable to the reasoning patterns necessary for establishing computational
security guarantees.
Next, we go through ILC in full, presenting its syntax, static semantics, dynamic semantics,
and metatheory.
3.1 SYNTAX
The syntax of types is given in Figure 3.1. Types (written U , V ) are bifurcated into
unrestricted types (written A, B) and affine types (written X, Y ).
A subset of the unrestricted types are sendable types (written S, T ), i.e., the types of
values that can be sent over channels. This restriction ensures that channels model network
channels, which send only data. The sendable types include unit (1), products (S× T ), and
sums (S+ T ).
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All types U, V ::= A Unrestricted type
| X Affine type
Sendable types S, T ::= 1 Unit type
| S × T Sendable product
| S+ T Sendable sum
Unrestricted types A,B ::= S Sendable type
| WrS Write endpoint
| A×B Unrestricted product
| A+B Unrestricted sum
| A→∞ U Unrestricted arrow
| A→w U Unrestricted write arrow
Affine types X, Y ::= !A Bang type
| RdS Read endpoint
| X ⊗ Y Affine product
| X ⊕ Y Affine sum
| X →1 U Affine arrow
Syntax labels ` ::= π Multiplicity
| w Write
Multiplicity labels π ::= 1 Affine
| ∞ Unrestricted
Unrestricted typings Γ ::= · Empty
| Γ, x : A Unrestricted extension
Affine typings ∆ ::= · Empty
| ∆, x : X Affine extension
| ∆, w Write token extension
Figure 3.1: Type syntax.
The unrestricted types include the sendable types, write endpoint types (WrS), products
(A×B), sums (A+B), arrows (A →∞ U or simply A → U), and write arrows (A →w U).
Jumping ahead slightly, write arrows specify unrestricted abstractions for which the write
token can be moved into the affine context of the abstraction body during β-reduction.
The affine types include bang types (!A), read endpoint types (RdS), products (X ⊗ Y ),
sums (X ⊕ Y ), and arrows (X →1 U or simply X ( U). The bang type operator lifts an
unrestricted value of type A into an affine type !A. Note that the write token w lives in the
affine context, though it cannot be bound to any variable. Instead, it flows around implicitly
by virtue of where read and write effects are performed (more details will be explained in
short order).
For concision, certain syntactic forms are parameterized by a multiplicity π to distinguish
between the unrestricted (∞) and affine (1) counterparts; other syntactic forms are param-
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Values v ::= () Unit
| (v1, v2)` Pair
| inj1`(v) Left injection
| inj2`(v) Right injection
| λ` x. e Function
| c Channel
| ! v Banged value
Channel endpoints c ::= Read(d) Read endpoint
| Write(d) Write endpoint
Channel names d ::= · · · Names
Figure 3.2: Value syntax.
eterized by a syntax label `, which includes the multiplicity labels and the write label w
(related to write effects). On introduction and elimination forms for functions (abstraction,
application, and fixed points), the label w denotes variants that move around the write token
as explained above. On introduction and elimination forms for products and sums, the label
w denotes the sendable variants.
The syntax of values is given in Figure 3.2. Values in ILC (written v) include unit, pairs,
sums, lambda expressions, channel endpoints (written c), and banged values. We distinguish
between the names of channel endpoints—Read(d) and Write(d)—and the channel d itself
that binds them.
The syntax of expressions is given in Figure 3.3. ILC supports a fairly standard feature
set of expressions. Bang-typed values have introduction form ! e and elimination form ¡ e.
The more interesting expressions are those related to communication and concurrency:
• Restriction: ν(x1, x2). e binds a read endpoint x1 and a corresponding write endpoint x2
in e.
• Write: wr(e1, e2) sends the value that e1 evaluates to on the write endpoint that e2 eval-
uates to.
• Read: rd(e1, x.e2) reads a value from the read endpoint that e1 evaluates to and binds the
value-endpoint pair as x in e2.
• Choice: ch(e1, x1.e3, e2, x2.e4) allows a process to continue as either e3 or e4 based on some
initial read event on one of the read endpoints that e1 and e2 evaluate to. The value read
over the channel and the two read endpoints are rebound in a 3-tuple as x1 in e3 or x2 in
e4. Here, we show only binary choice, but it can be generalized to the n-ary case.
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Expressions e ::= x Variable
| () Unit
| (e1, e2)` Pair introduction
| inji`(e) Injection introduction
| split`(e1, x1.x2.e2) Pair elimination
| case`(e, x1.e1, x2.e2) Injection elimination
| λ` x. e Function abstraction
| (e1 e2)` Function application
| fix`(x.e) Fixpoint
| letπ(e1, x.e2) Let binding
| ! e Bang introduction
| ¡ e Bang elimination
| ν(x1, x2). e Channel restriction
| wr(e1, e2) Write operation
| rd(e1, x.e2) Read operation
| ch(e1, x1.e3, e2, x2.e4) External choice
| e1 |B e2 Fork operation
Figure 3.3: Expression syntax.
• Fork: e1 |B e2 spawns a child process e1 and continues as e2.
3.2 STATIC SEMANTICS
ILC terms have either an unrestricted type, meaning they can be freely copied, or an affine
type, meaning they can be used at most once. Affine typing serves a special purpose, namely,
to ensure that ILC processes have a determined sequence of activations, as is required in
ITMs. This is achieved through the following type-level invariants:
• Only one process is active at any given time. Processes implicitly pass around an affine
“write token” w by virtue of where they perform read and write effects. In order for
process A to write to process B, process A must first own the write token. Because the
write token is unique, at most one process owns the write token (“is active” or “can write”)
at any given time. When process B reads the message from A, process B earns the write
token, thereby conserving its uniqueness and now allowing process B to write to some
other process.
• The order of activations is deterministic. Each channel (or “tape” in ITM parlance) has
a read endpoint and a write endpoint. The read endpoint is an affine resource, and so it
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is owned by at most one process. This ensures that each write operation corresponds to
a single, unique read operation.
Intuitively, the first invariant rules out the possibility of write nondeterminism. Consider
the case in which two processes are trying to execute writes in parallel, which would lead to
a race condition. This does not typecheck, since the affine write token belongs to at most
one process. One might justifiably wonder why write endpoints are unrestricted and read
endpoints are affine. Note that if two processes are trying to write in parallel, the two write
endpoints need not be the same, so making write endpoints affine would not help our case
in eliminating write nondeterminism.
Dually, the second invariant rules out the possibility of read nondeterminism. Consider
the case in which two processes A and B are listening on the same read endpoint. If a process
C writes on the corresponding write endpoint, which of A or B (or both) gets activation?
If only one of them is activated, then we have a source of nondeterminism. If both are
activated, now A and B both own write tokens, violating its affinity. In any case, this
does not typecheck since read endpoints are affine resources, making it impossible for two
processes A and B to listen on the same read endpoint. Together, these invariants ensure
that processes have a determined sequence of activations as desired.
The typing rules of ILC are collected in Figures 3.4 and 3.5. An algorithmic version of the
rules appears in Appendix A.1. We read the typing judgement ∆; Γ ` e : U as “under affine
context ∆ and unrestricted context Γ, expression e has type U .” In full detail, the typing
judgement also includes a typing context Ψ, which maps channel names d to sendable types
S. However, it is only used in two special rules for typing channel endpoints that do not
arise for source level programs, but will be needed to typecheck a running program that has
performed channel allocation:
Ψ(d) = S
Ψ; ∆; Γ ` Read(d) : RdS
rdend
Ψ(d) = S
Ψ; ∆; Γ `Write(d) : WrS
wrend
This pair of rules establish the canonical forms for the types of channel endpoints, RdS and
WrS. We use the metavariable c to range over these two canonical forms.
The typing rules for the functional fragment of ILC are fairly standard, except that they
now have unrestricted and affine variants (and for some, sendable variants).
·; Γ, x : A ` e : U
∆; Γ ` λ∞ x. e : A→∞ U
uabs
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The rule for unrestricted abstraction (uabs) extends the unrestricted context Γ with x : A
before checking the body e of the abstraction. Notice that because unrestricted abstractions
can be duplicated, the body must be affinely closed (cannot contain free affine variables).
w ; Γ, x : A ` e : U
∆; Γ ` λw x. e : A→w U
wabs
The rule for write abstraction (wabs) is similar to uabs. The only difference is that wabs
extends the affine context with the write token before checking the body e of the abstraction.
Dually, the write application rule (wapp) stipulates that a process must own the write token
in order to apply a write abstraction.
∆, x : X; Γ ` e : U
∆; Γ ` λ1 x. e : X →1 U
aabs
The rule for affine abstraction (aabs) is analagous to uabs, but notice that the body need
not be affinely closed, since affine abstractions cannot be duplicated. It turns out that most
affine functions we write are affinely closed, and so such a function f : X ( U can be made
into an unrestricted function g : A→ X ( U by adding a leading unrestricted argument.
∆; Γ ` e : A
∆; Γ ` ! e : !A
bang
The bang rule turns an unrestrictedly typed expression e : A into an affinely typed expression
e : !A. Dually, the gnab rule turns an affinely typed expression e : !A into an unrestrictedly
typed expression e : A.
∆1; Γ ` e1 : U ∆2; Γ ` e2 : V
∆1,∆2; Γ ` e1 |B e2 : V
fork
The fork expression e1 |B e2 spawns a child process e1 and continues as e2. Its typing rule
says that if we can partition the affine context as ∆1,∆2 such that e1 has type U under
contexts ∆1; Γ and e2 has type V under contexts ∆2; Γ, then the expression has type V .
Notice that affine resources (e.g., read endpoints and the write token) must be split between
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the child process and the parent process, thereby preventing their duplication.
∆1; Γ ` e1 : S ∆2; Γ ` e2 : WrS
∆1,∆2, w ; Γ ` wr(e1, e2) : 1
wr
The write expression wr(e1, e2) sends the value that e1 evaluates to on the write endpoint
that e2 evaluates to. One thing to mention is that only values of a sendable type (ranged
over by S) can be sent over channels (more on this later). Its typing rule says that if we
own the write token and we can partition the affine context as ∆1,∆2 such that e1 has type
S under contexts ∆1; Γ and e2 evaluates to a write endpoint (of type WrS) under contexts
∆2; Γ, then the expression has type 1 (unit). Notice that typing a write expression spends
the write token, and so it cannot execute another write until it gets “reactivated” by reading
from some other process.
w 6∈ ∆2 ∆1; Γ ` e1 : RdS
∆2, w , x : !S ⊗ RdS; Γ ` e2 : U
∆1,∆2; Γ ` rd(e1, x.e2) : U
rd
The read expression rd(e1, x.e2) reads a value on the read endpoint that e1 evaluates to and
binds the value-endpoint pair as x in the affine context of e2. Rebinding the read endpoint
allows it to be reused. Its typing rule says that if we can partition the affine context as
∆1,∆2 such that e1 evaluates to a read endpoint (of type RdS) under contexts ∆1; Γ, and
e2 has type U under contexts ∆2, w , x : !S ⊗ RdS; Γ, then the expression has type U .
There are a few things to unpack here. First, we explain the affine product type !S⊗RdS.
Since sendable values are unrestricted and read endpoints are affine, the value read on the
channel is wrapped in a ! operator (pronounced “bang”) so that it can be placed in an affine
pair. Next, observe that w is available in the body e2 of the read expression (i.e., it is
conserved), but only under the condition that it is not already in the affine context ∆2
(otherwise, a process could arbitrarily mint write tokens, violating its affinity).
∆, x1 : RdS; Γ, x2 : WrS ` e : U
∆; Γ ` ν(x1, x2). e : U
nu
The nu rule extends the affine context ∆ with a read endpoint x1 : RdS and the unrestricted
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context Γ with a corresponding write endpoint x2 : WrS before typing the body e.
w 6∈ ∆3 ∆1; Γ ` e1 : RdS ∆2; Γ ` e2 : RdT
∆3, w , x1 : !S ⊗ RdS ⊗ RdT ; Γ ` e3 : U
∆3, w , x2 : !T ⊗ RdS ⊗ RdT ; Γ ` e4 : U
∆1,∆2,∆3; Γ ` ch(e1, x1.e3, e2, x2.e4) : U
choice
The choice rule partitions the affine context as ∆1,∆2,∆3. The first two affine contexts are
used to type e1 : RdS and e2 : RdT , respectively. The third affine context ∆3 is extended
with the affine write token and a variable x1 (or x2) binding an affine 3-tuple containing the
read value and the two read endpoints before checking the continuation e3 (or e4). While
somewhat cumbersome, the generality of this rule allows both read endpoints to be used in
either continuation.
3.3 DYNAMIC SEMANTICS
Figure 3.6 defines the dynamic syntax of ILC. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 define the configuration
and local reduction semantics of ILC, respectively. We define a configuration C as a tuple of
dynamic channel and process names Σ, and a pool of running and terminated processes π.
We read the configuration reduction judgment C1 −→ C2 as “configuration C1 steps to
configuration C2,” and the local stepping judgment e1 −→ e2 for a single process e as
“expression e1 steps to expression e2.” The rules of local stepping follow a standard call-by-
value semantics, where we streamline the definition with an evaluation context E.
Configuration stepping consists of six rules. These include a congruence rule congr that
permits some of the other rules to be simpler, by making the order of the pool unimportant.
The relation π1 ≡perm π2 holds when π2 is a permutation of π1. The other five rules consist of
local stepping (via local), creating new processes (via fork), creating new channels (via nu),
read-write interactions (via rw), and choice-write interactions (via cw). To avoid allocating
the same name twice, the name set Σ records names of allocated channels and processes.
We define the relation c1  c2 to hold when c1 is the write endpoint of a corresponding read
endpoint c2.
3.4 METATHEORY
Intuitively, ILC’s type system design enforces that a configuration’s reduction consists of
a unique (deterministic) sequence of reader-writer process pairings, and is confluent with
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any other reduction choice that exchanges the order of other (non-interactive) reduction
steps. As explained in Section 3, ILC’s type system does so by restricting the write effects
(via an affine write token) and read effects (via affine read endpoints) of processes. The
proofs of type soundness, whose statements we discuss next, establish the validity of these
invariants. These language-level invariants support confluence theorems, also stated below.
These theorems include full confluence: Any two full reductions of a configuration yield a
pair of equivalent configurations (isomorphic, up to a renaming of nondeterministic name
choices).
3.4.1 Type Soundness
We prove type soundness of ILC via mostly-standard notions of progress and preservation.
To state these theorems, we follow the usual recipe, except that we give a special definition of
program termination that permits deadlocks. (Recall that ILC is concerned with enforcing
confluence as its central metatheoretic property, not deadlock freedom.) Informally, C term
holds when either:
1. C is fully normal: Every process in C is normalized (consists of a value), or
2. C is (at least partially) deadlocked: Some (possibly empty) portion of C is normal, and
there exists one or more reading processes in C, or there exists one or more writing
processes in C, however, no reader-writer process pair exists for a common channel.
We also extend the type system given in Section 3.2 with typing rules for configurations,
including process pool typings Φ from process names p to types U . These details, along with
the proofs of progress and preservation, can be found in Appendix A.2.
Theorem 3.1 (Progress). If Ψ ` C : Φ, then either C term or there exists C ′ such that
C −→ C ′.
Theorem 3.2 (Preservation). If Ψ ` C : Φ and C −→ C ′, then there exists Ψ′ ⊇ Ψ and
Φ′ ⊇ Φ such that Ψ′ ` C ′ : Φ′.
3.4.2 Confluence
Confluence implies, among other things, that the order of reduction steps is inconsequen-
tial, and that no process scheduling choices will affect the final outcome. ILC’s type system
enforces confluence up to nondeterministic naming choices in rules nu and fork (Figure 3.7).
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To account for different choices of dynamically-named channels and processes, respectively,
we state and prove confluence with respect to a renaming function f , which consistently
renames these choices in a related configuration:
Theorem 3.3 (Single-step confluence). For all well-typed configurations C, if C −→ C1 and
C −→ C2, then there exists a renaming function f such that either:
1. C1 = f(C2), or
2. there exists C3 such that C1 −→ C3 and f(C2) −→ C3.
Intuitively, the sister configuration C2 is either different because of a name choice (case
1), or a different process scheduling choice (case 2). In either case, there exists a renaming
of any choice made to reach C2, captured by function f . By composing multiple uses of this
theorem, and the renaming functions that they construct, we prove a multi-step notion of
confluence that reduces a single configuration C to two equivalent terminal configurations,
C1 and C2:
Theorem 3.4 (Full confluence). For all well-typed configurations C, if C −→∗ C1 and
C −→∗ C2 and C1 term and C2 term, then there exists renaming function f such that
C1 = f(C2).
The proofs of these statements can be found in Appendix A.3.
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∆; Γ ` e : U Under affine context ∆ and unrestricted context Γ, expression e has type U .
Γ(x) = A
∆; Γ ` x : A uvar
∆(x) = X
∆; Γ ` x : X avar ∆; Γ ` () : 1 unit
∆1; Γ ` e1 : A1 ∆2; Γ ` e2 : A2
∆1,∆2; Γ ` (e1, e2)∞ : A1×A2
upair
∆1; Γ ` e1 : S1 ∆2; Γ ` e2 : S2
∆1,∆2; Γ ` (e1, e2)w : S1× S2
spair
∆1; Γ ` e1 : X1 ∆2; Γ ` e2 : X2
∆1,∆2; Γ ` (e1, e2)1 : X1 ⊗X2
apair
i ∈ {1, 2} ∆; Γ ` e : Ai
∆; Γ ` inji∞(e) : A1 +A2
uinj
i ∈ {1, 2} ∆; Γ ` e : Si
∆; Γ ` injiw(e) : S1 + S2
sinj
i ∈ {1, 2} ∆; Γ ` e : Xi
∆; Γ ` inji1(e) : X1 ⊕X2
ainj
∆1; Γ ` e1 : A1×A2
∆2; Γ, x1 : A1, x2 : A2 ` e : U
∆1,∆2; Γ ` split∞(e1, x1.x2.e2) : U
usplit
∆1; Γ ` e1 : S1× S2
∆2; Γ, x1 : S1, x2 : S2 ` e : U
∆1,∆2; Γ ` splitw(e1, x1.x2.e2) : U
ssplit
∆1; Γ ` e1 : X1 ⊗X2
∆2, x1 : X1, x2 : X2; Γ ` e : U
∆1,∆2; Γ ` split1(e1, x1.x2.e2) : U
asplit
∆1; Γ ` e : A1 +A2
∆2; Γ, x1 : A1 ` e1 : U
∆2; Γ, x2 : A2 ` e2 : U
∆1,∆2; Γ ` case∞(e, x1.e1, x2.e2) : U
ucase
∆1; Γ ` e : S1 + S2
∆2; Γ, x1 : S1 ` e1 : U
∆2; Γ, x2 : S2 ` e2 : U
∆1,∆2; Γ ` casew(e, x1.e1, x2.e2) : U
scase
∆1; Γ ` e : X1 ⊕X2
∆2, x1 : X1; Γ ` e1 : U
∆2, x2 : X2; Γ ` e2 : U
∆1,∆2; Γ ` case1(e, x1.e1, x2.e2) : U
acase
·; Γ, x : A ` e : U
∆; Γ ` λ∞ x. e : A→∞ U
uabs
w ; Γ, x : A ` e : U
∆; Γ ` λw x. e : A→w U
wabs
∆, x : X; Γ ` e : U
∆; Γ ` λ1 x. e : X →1 U
aabs
∆1; Γ ` e2 : A
∆2; Γ ` e1 : A→∞ U
∆1,∆2; Γ ` (e1 e2)∞ : U
uapp
∆1; Γ ` e2 : A
∆2; Γ ` e1 : A→w U
∆1,∆2, w ; Γ ` (e1 e2)w : U
wapp
∆1; Γ ` e2 : X ∆2; Γ ` e1 : X →1 U
∆1,∆2; Γ ` (e1 e2)1 : U
aapp
Figure 3.4: Typing rules.
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·; Γ, x : A→∞ U ` e : A→∞ U
∆; Γ ` fix∞(x.e) : A→∞ U
ufix
·; Γ, x : A→w U ` e : A→w U
∆; Γ ` fixw(x.e) : A→w U
wfix
x : X →1 U ; Γ ` e : X →1 U
∆; Γ ` fix1(x.e) : X →1 U
afix
∆1; Γ ` e1 : A
∆2; Γ, x : A ` e2 : U
∆1,∆2; Γ ` let∞(e1, x.e2) : U
ulet
∆1; Γ ` e1 : X
∆2, x : X; Γ ` e2 : U
∆1,∆2; Γ ` let1(e1, x.e2) : U
alet
∆; Γ ` e : A
∆; Γ ` ! e : !A bang
∆; Γ ` e : !A
∆; Γ ` ¡ e : A gnab
∆, x1 : RdS; Γ, x2 : WrS ` e : U
∆; Γ ` ν(x1, x2). e : U
nu
∆1; Γ ` e1 : S
∆2; Γ ` e2 : WrS
∆1,∆2, w ; Γ ` wr(e1, e2) : 1
wr
w 6∈ ∆2 ∆1; Γ ` e1 : RdS
∆2, w , x : !S ⊗ RdS; Γ ` e2 : U
∆1,∆2; Γ ` rd(e1, x.e2) : U
rd
w 6∈ ∆3 ∆1; Γ ` e1 : RdS ∆2; Γ ` e2 : RdT
∆3, w , x1 : !S ⊗ RdS ⊗ RdT ; Γ ` e3 : U
∆3, w , x2 : !T ⊗ RdS ⊗ RdT ; Γ ` e4 : U
∆1,∆2,∆3; Γ ` ch(e1, x1.e3, e2, x2.e4) : U
choice
∆1; Γ ` e1 : U
∆2; Γ ` e2 : V
∆1,∆2; Γ ` e1 |B e2 : V
fork
Figure 3.5: Typing rules continued.
Process names p, q ::= · · ·
Name sets Σ ::= ε | Σ, d | Σ, p
Process pools π ::= ε | π, p : e
Configurations C ::= 〈Σ; π〉
Evaluation E ::= • | (E, e)` | (v, E)` | inji`(E)
contexts | split`(E, x1.x2.e) | case`(E, x1.e1, x2.e2)
| (E e)` | (v E)` | letπ(E, x.e) | !E | ¡E
| wr(E, e) | wr(v, E) | rd(E, x.e)
| ch(E, x1.e3, e2, x2.e4) | ch(c, x1.e3, E, x2.e4)
Figure 3.6: ILC dynamic syntax.
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C1 ≡ C2 Configurations C1 and C2 are equivalent.
π1 ≡perm π2
〈Σ; π1〉 ≡ 〈Σ; π2〉
permProcs
c1  c2 Write endpoint c1 connects to read endpoint c2.
Write(d) Read(d)
bind
C1 −→ C2 Configuration C1 reduces to C2.
e1 −→ e2
〈Σ; π, p : E[e1]〉 −→ 〈Σ;π, p : E[e2]〉
local
q /∈ Σ
〈Σ;π, p : E[e1 |B e2]〉 −→ 〈Σ, q; π, q : e1, p : E[e2]〉
fork




〈Σ;π, p : E[ν(x1, x2). e]〉 −→ 〈Σ, d; π, p : E[[Read(d)/x1][Write(d)/x2]e]〉
nu
c2  c1
〈Σ;π, p : E1[rd(c1, x.e)], q : E2[wr(v, c2)]〉 −→ 〈Σ;π, p : E1[[(!v, c1)1/x]e], q : E2[()]〉
rw
c ci i ∈ {1, 2}
〈Σ;π, p : E1[ch(c1, x1.e1, c2, x2.e2)], q : E2[wr(v, c)]〉 −→
〈Σ;π, p : E1[[(!v, c1, c2)1/xi]ei], q : E2[()]〉
cw
Figure 3.7: Configuration reduction rules.
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e1 −→ e2 Expression e1 reduces to e2.
letπ(v, x.e) −→ [v/x]e
let
((λ` x. e) v)` −→ [v/x]e
app
split`((v1, v2)`, x1.x2.e) −→ [v1/x1][v2/x2]e
split
¡ (! v) −→ v gnab




Figure 3.8: Local reduction rules.
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CHAPTER 4: SAUCY
Using ILC, we build a concrete, executable implementation of a simplified UC framework,
dubbed SaUCy. Then, we demonstrate the versatility of SaUCy in three ways:
1. We define a protocol composition operator and prove its associated composition theorem.
2. We walk through an instantiation of UC commitments.
3. We use ILC’s type system to reason about “reentrancy,” a subtle definitional issue in UC
that has only recently been studied.
4.1 PROBABILISTIC POLYNOMIAL TIME IN ILC
The goal of cryptography reduction is to relate every bad event in a protocol to a prob-
abilistic polynomial time computation that solves a hard problem. The ILC typing rules
do not guarantee termination, let alone polynomial time normalization, so we must tackle
this in metatheory. Also, since ILC is effectively deterministic (confluent), we will need to
express random choices some other way. To meet these needs, we define a judgment about
ILC terms that take a security parameter and a stream of random bits.
Definition 4.1 (Polynomial time normalization). The judgment that e is polynomial time
normalizable, written PPT e, is defined as follows:
·; · ` e : Nat→ [Bit]→ Bit ∀ k ∈ Nat. ∀ r ∈ [Bit]poly(k). e k r →poly(k) v
PPT e
ppt
This says that if for all security parameters k and all bitstrings r (of length polynomial in
k) the term e k r normalizes to a value v in poly(k) steps, then PPT e.
Here, we have chosen a simple definition of polynomial time defined only for closed terms
(i.e., an entire system of ITMs), and that requires polynomial time normalization for every
choice of random bits, not just in expectation or with high probability.
We note that most UC variants use a more nuanced definition in which the individual ITM
entities, such as the environment or protocol, can be judged polynomial time independently of
their surrounding context [13, 14, 1]. Looking ahead to Section 4.3, this choice will constrain
our definition of secure protocol emulation. Hofheinz et al. [15] give a detailed discussion
of subtle issues arising with various polynomial time definitions and their consequences for
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defining UC security. Regardless, the present notion suffices for our examples. We consider
this issue complementary to the design of ILC itself, and adapting other notions of polynomial
time to ILC as important future work. As an example, the polynomial time notion used in
IITMs [14] relies on a distinction between “invited” and “uninvited” messages, which could
be captured through refinement types à la the RCF calculus [16].
Definition 4.2 (Value Distribution). Because processes are confluent, we know that if
e k r →∗ v, then the value v is unique. We can therefore define the probability distri-
bution ensemble D(e) = {De,k}k based on a uniform distribution Uk over k-bit strings r, so




Uk(r), for R = {r | e k r →∗ v}.
Definition 4.3 (Indistinguishability). What remains is to define a notion of indistinguisha-
bility for value distributions. However, we need to clarify when polynomial time normal-
ization is an assumption or a proof obligation. To simplify things later, we define a partial
order e1 ≤ e2, which captures that e2 must be PPT if e1 is PPT, and if so, that their value
distributions are statistically similar.
PPT e1 =⇒ (PPT e2 and D(e1) ∼ D(e2))
e1 ≤ e2
indist
4.2 SAUCY EXECUTION MODEL
The implementation of SaUCy is centered around a definition of the UC execution model
in ILC, presented in Figure 4.1. The function execUC takes as arguments an environment
z, a pair of protocol processes (p, q), a functionality f, an adversary a, a corruption model
crupt, a security parameter k, and a random bitstring r. At a high level (ignoring corruption
details for now), it runs each of the processes (allocating random bits to each of them) and
connects channels as illustrated. The channels follow a uniform naming scheme. The read
end of a channel is prefixed with r- and the write end of a channel is prefixed with w-. The
channel rZ2P denotes the read end of communications from the environment z to the party
p.
Next, we explain some of our main modeling choices and the consequences they have for
the ILC implementation. To start with, we make several simplifications to standard UC,
for example, focusing on the special case of two-party protocols (à la Simplified UC [17]).
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execUC :: Az→w Ap × Aq → Af → Aa → Crupt→ Nat → [Bit]→ Bit
let execUC z (p,q) f a crupt k r =
ν (rZ2P, wZ2P), (rP2Z, wP2Z)
, (rZ2Q, wZ2Q), (rQ2Z, wQ2Z)
, (rP2F, wP2F), (rF2P, wF2P)
, (rQ2F, wQ2F), (rF2Q, wF2Q)
, (rF2A, wF2A), (rA2F, wA2F)
, (rA2Z, wA2Z), (rZ2A, wZ2A)
, (rP2A, wP2A), (rA2P, wA2P)
, (rQ2A, wQ2A), (rA2Q, wA2Q)
, (rP2Q, wP2Q), (rQ2P, wQ2P)
. let (rf,ra,rp,rq,rz) = splitBits r in
f k rf crupt wF2P wF2Q wF2A rP2F rQ2F rA2F
|B a k ra crupt wA2Z wA2F wA2P wA2Q rZ2A rF2A rP2A rQ2A
|B corruptOrNot p k rp (crupt == CruptP) wP2Z wP2F wP2A wP2Q rZ2P rF2P rA2P rQ2P
|B corruptOrNot q k rq (crupt == CruptQ) wQ2Z wQ2F wQ2A wQ2P rZ2Q rF2Q rA2Q rP2Q




Figure 4.1: Full implementation of execUC.
We also only aim to show the case of static corruptions, in which the corrupt parties are
determined at the onset. This is achieved by parameterizing the entire experiment by a value
crupt : Crupt denoting which parties are corrupt (if any). The data type Crupt is defined as
follows.
data Crupt = CruptP | CruptQ | CruptNone
For a more general model with adaptive corruptions, execUC would need to accept requests
from the environment to add to the crupt list as the execution proceeds.
Our corruption model is Byzantine, meaning the adversary gets to exert complete control
over the corrupted parties. For each party, depending on the value of crupt, either we run a
copy of the honest party, or connect the channels to the adversary. This is implemented in
the function corruptOrNot.
fwd :: ∀ a b . Wr a→ Rd a( b
letrec fwd toR frS =
let (!msg, frS) = rd frS in wr msg→ toR ; fwd toR frS
corruptOrNot :: ∀ ... . Ap → Nat→ [Bit]→ Bool→ · · ·
let corruptOrNot p k bits iscrupt toZ toF toA toQ
frZ frF frA frQ =
if iscrupt then
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let _ = rd frZ in error "Z can't wr to corrupt"
|B fwd toA frF
|B fwd toA frQ
|B fwd toF frA
else
p k bits toZ toF toQ frZ frF frQ
The fwd function simply forwards messages received on the read endpoint frS to the write
endpoint toR. In corruptOrNot, if a party is corrupted, messages from the functionality and
the other protocol party are forwarded to the adversary; messages from the adversary are
forwarded to the functionality. Otherwise, the party is run as normal.
We also model a strong form of communication channels between the parties: P and Q
are connected by a pair of raw ILC channels. Communication over these channels happens
immediately, without activating the adversary or leaking even the existence of the message.
In a more realistic model, the parties would only be able to communicate over a network
channel modeled as a functionality, Fsmt or Fsyn [1]. Consequently our Fcom functionality
would need to be weakened by leaking some (model-specific) information about the message
to the adversary.
A few important processes include the dummy party and the dummy adversary.
dummyP :: ∀ a b ... . Nat→ [Bit]→Wr a→ · · · b
let dummyP k r toZ toF toQ frZ frF frQ = fwd toF frZ |B fwd toZ frF
The dummy party simply relays information between the environment and the functionality.
dummy :: ∀ a ... . Nat→ [Bit]→ Crupt→ · · · a
let dummyA k bits crupt toZ toF toP toQ toQasP frZ frF frP frQ toPasQ=
let fwd2Z () c = loop (λ m . wr (X2Z m)→ toZ) c in
loop (λ x . match x with
| A2F m⇒ wr m→ toF
| A2P m⇒ if crupt == CruptP
then wr m→ toQasP
else wr m→ toP) frZ
|B fwd2Z () frF
|B fwd2Z () frP
|B fwd2Z () frQ
The dummy adversary forwards messages from the environment to either the functionality
(if the message has constructor A2F) or the party p (if the message has constructor A2P).
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Similarly, the dummy adversary forwards messages from the functionality or the procotol
parties to the environment.
4.3 DEFINING UC SECURITY IN ILC
The central security definition in UC is protocol emulation. The guiding principle is that
π emulates φ if the environment cannot distinguish between the two protocols. Our first
attempt is the following, where S is the simulator that translates every attack in the real
world into an attack expressed in the ideal world:
∀ Z. execUC Z π F1 1A ≤ execUC Z φ F2 S
S ` (π,F1) ≈ (φ,F2)
emulate
To remark on a few notational choices: We make the functionality explicit, so emulation is a
relationship between protocol-functionality pairs. Here, 1A is the dummy adversary, which
just relays messages between the environment and the parties/functionality. We elide the
standard dummy lemma that shows this is without loss of generality; the intuition is that
whatever an adversary can do, the environment can achieve using 1A.
Unfortunately this simple definition turns out to be vacuous: a degenerate protocol π can
emulate anything simply failing to be PPT, e.g., by diverging. To put it another way, the
problem is the definition imposes a proof obligation on the simulator S but not on π. What
we want to say is that the real world protocol (π,F1) must be well behaved whenever the
ideal world (φ,F2) is. However, even a reasonable protocol can result in non-PPT executions
if paired with a divergent environment. To solve this problem, we define protocol emulation
by requiring a simulation in both directions, so every behavior in the ideal world must
correspond to a behavior in the real world and vice versa.
Definition 4.4 (Protocol Emulation). The judgment that one protocol-functionality pair
(π,F1) securely emulates another (φ,F2) (as proven by the simulators SR,SI) is defined as
∀ Z. execUC Z φ F2 1A ≤ execUC Z π F1 SR
execUC Z π F1 1A ≤ execUC Z φ F2 SI
SR,SI ` (π,F1) ≈ (φ,F2)
emulate
We remark this definition goes against the UC convention of requiring simulation in one di-
rection only. One direction is preferable intuitively because it should be fine if the protocol is
even more secure than its specification. This does not pose any problem for our commitment
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example; however, a protocol that leaks even less information than its ideal functionality
requires would be impossible to prove secure under this definition. In any case, the benefit
is this simplifies the polynomial time notion: vacuous protocols are clearly ruled out by the
top condition, and both simulations are only required to be PPT when the environment Z is
well-behaved.
4.4 A COMPOSITION THEOREM IN SAUCY
As a first demonstration of SaUCy, we work through the development of a composition
operator, and give a theorem explaining its use.
Definition 4.5 (UC realizes). To set out, we introduce the notation of “realizes,” which
views a protocol as a way of instantiating a specification functionality F2 from a setup
assumption functionality F1,
(π, F1) ≈ (idπ,F2)
F1 π−→ F2
realizes
where idπ is the dummy protocol, which simply relays messages between the environment
and the functionality. This notation is convenient because it suggests a categorical approach
to composition.
Theorem 4.1 (Composition Theorem).
F1 π−→ F2 F2 ρ−→ F3
F1 ρ ◦ π−−−→ F3
The idea is that the ρ ◦ π can be defined in a natural way, where the ideal functionality
channel of ρ is connected to the environment channel of π, as illustrated and defined in
Figure 4.2.
Proof. To prove the theorem we construct the simulators SR,ρ◦SR,π (respectively SI,ρ◦SI,π)
in the natural way as well (see the appendix). Our proof obligation is to introduce an
arbitrary environment Z and conclude
execUC Z (ρ ◦ π) F1 1A ≤ execUC Z 1π F3 (SI,ρ ◦ SI,π).
The main idea is to notice that that we can bring ρ from the composed protocol into the en-








let (◦) (ρP , ρQ) (πP , πQ)
wρP2Z wρQ2Z wρP2F wρQ2F
wρP2ρQ wρQ2ρP rZ2ρP rZ2ρQ
rF2ρP rF2ρQ rρQ2ρP rρP2ρQ =
ν ... . πP wπP2ρP wρP2F wπP2πQ rρP2πP rF2ρP rπQ2πP
|B πQ wπQ2ρQ wρQ2F wπQ2πP rρQ2πQ rF2ρQ rπP2πQ
|B ρP wρP2Z wρP2πP wρP2ρQ rZ2ρP rπP2ρP rρQ2ρP
|B ρQ wρQ2Z wρQ2πQ wρQ2ρP rZ2ρQ rπQ2ρQ rρP2ρQ
Figure 4.2: Protocol composition operator.
outer protocols. This transformation results in an equivalent term, given that ILC configu-
rations are invariant to channel renaming and reordering of processes in a configuration (as
in Section 3.4). The following derivation completes the proof:
execUC Z (ρ ◦ π) F1 1A (4.1)
≡ execUC (Z ◦ ρ) π F1 1A (By equivalence) (4.2)
≤ execUC (Z ◦ ρ) idπ F2 SI,π (From F1 π−→ F2) (4.3)
≡ execUC (SI,π ◦ Z) ρ F2 1A (By equivalence) (4.4)
≤ execUC (SI,π ◦ Z) idπ F3 SI,ρ (From F2 ρ−→ F3) (4.5)
≡ execUC Z idπ F3 (SI,π ◦ SI,ρ) (By equivalence) (4.6)
The remaining case for SR,ρ ◦ SR,π is symmetric. QED.
Other notions of composition. Our composition operator above is just a starting point.
The “universal composition” [1] operator essentially multiplexes sessions identified by unique
tags (session ids), while a joint state composition theorem collapses multiple subroutines
into one [18]. Despite its name, development in UC often involves defining additional compo-
sition operators. For example, interesting composition often happens “in the functionality”
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through higher order “wrapper” functionalities [19, 20] which we would express through ab-
straction. Some security properties require a generalized notion of ideal functionality that
the environment can interact with directly. All the above motivate the development of the
ILC core calculus as a flexible foundation; developing them in ILC is important future work.
4.5 INSTANTIATING UC COMMITMENTS
Instantiation proofs in SaUCy follow a standard rhythm. We start with a security defini-
tion as an ideal functionality, give the protocol, construct a simulator, and finally complete
the relational analysis on paper. To make this more concrete, we walk through an instanti-
ation of UC commitments (à la Canetti and Fischlin [21]).
Commitment is an essential building block in many cryptographic protocols [22]. The idea
behind commitment is simple: A committer provides a receiver with the digital equivalent
of a “sealed envelope” containing some value that can later be revealed. The commitment
scheme must be hiding in the sense that the commitment itself reveals no information about
the committed value, and binding in the sense that the committer can only open the com-
mitment to a single value. For security under composition, an additional non-malleability
property is required, which roughly prevents an attacker from using one commitment to
derive another related one.
While commitments are one of the simplest UC primitives, as a case study, this serves two
main purposes. First, the proof demonstrates several representative UC techniques [8], in
particular the simulator makes use of a “trusted setup” and extracts inputs from a corrupt
sender. Second, the protocol makes use of computational primitives and thus requires a
reduction step in the proof, which can go through because of ILC’s confluent design.
Extending ILC with cryptographic primitives. UC Commitments are realized from
cryptographic primitives, such as trapdoor permutations, which require extensions to ILC.
The new syntactic forms are kgen, tdp, inv, and hc with the static and dynamic seman-
tics shown in Figure 4.3. The semantics are written in terms of the cryptographic objects
themselves.
The key generation function keygen takes as input a random bitstring and outputs a
random public key vpk and a trapdoor vtd. The trapdoor permutation function tdp takes as
inputs a key vpk and a bitstring vin and outputs a bitstring vout. The inv function takes as
inputs a key-trapdoor pair (vpk, vtd) and a bitstring vin and outputs a bitstring vout. The
hardcore predicate function hc takes as input a key vpk and outputs a single bit.
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Expressions e ::= kgen(e) | tdp(e1, e2) | inv(e1, e2) | hc(e)
∆; Γ ` e : U Under affine context ∆ and unrestricted context Γ, expression e has type U .
∆; Γ ` e : [Bit]
∆; Γ ` kgen(e) : [Bit]× [Bit] kgen
∆1; Γ ` e1 : [Bit] ∆2; Γ ` e2 : [Bit]
∆1,∆2; Γ ` tdp(e1, e2) : [Bit]
tdp
∆1; Γ ` e1 : [Bit]× [Bit] ∆2; Γ ` e2 : [Bit]
∆1,∆2; Γ ` inv(e1, e2) : [Bit]
inv
∆; Γ ` e : [Bit]→ Bit
∆; Γ ` hc(e) : Bit hc
e1 −→ e2 Expression e1 reduces to e2.
Gen(vr) = (vpk, vtd)∞ vpk, vtd ∈ {0, 1}k
kgen(vr) −→ (vpk, vtd)∞
kgen
f(vpk, vin) = vout f : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}k → {0, 1}k
tdp(vpk, vin) −→ vout
tdp
Inv((vpk, vtd)∞, vin) = vout Inv : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}k → {0, 1}k → {0, 1}k
inv((vpk, vtd)∞, vin) −→ vout
inv
B(vpk) = v B : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}
hc(vpk) −→ v
hc
Figure 4.3: Extending ILC with trapdoor permutations. The semantics are parameterized
by a security parameter k.
The UC commitment protocol makes use of a cryptographic primitive, namely a trapdoor
pseudorandom generator. This is provided by extending ILC with new syntactic forms, along
with their static and dynamic semantics.
We can use these to implement a special pseudorandom number generator Gpk : {0, 1}k →
{0, 1}4k that has a trapdoor property, i.e., it is easy to compute, but difficult to invert except







pk (r)), . . . ,B(fpk(r)),B(r)
)
(4.7)
Here, fpk is a trapdoor permutation over {0, 1}k, with f (i)pk (r) denoting the ith-fold application
of fpk, and B is a hardcore predicate for fpk. In ILC, this can be implemented as:
iterate :: ∀ a . Int→ (a→ a)→ a→ a
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prg :: [Bit]→ [Bit]→ Nat→ [Bit]
let prg pk r k =
letrec aux j =
if j ≤ 0 then [hc r]
else hc (iterate j (tdp pk) r) : aux pk r (j − 1) in
iterate (3 ∗ k) (tdp pk) r ++ aux pk r (3 ∗ k − 1)
While in a symbolic setting we would instantiate these with algebraic data, in ILC we
give the stepping rule in terms of an arbitrary pseudorandom function family, i.e., the actual
computational definition. This can be instantiated concretely for execution (e.g., with an
RSA-based function) or treated abstractly in the metatheory when we get to the reduction
step of the proof.
The commitment protocol also relies on a “trusted setup,” or common reference string
(CRS), which is essentially public parameters generated ahead of time. The common refer-
ence string is modeled as an ideal functionality Fcrs.
Commitment Protocol. We now give the full elaboration of our UC commitment in-
stantiation. The specification functionality is as follows:
fCom :: Nat→ [Bit]→ Crupt→ · · ·( R 1
let fCom k bits crupt toP toQ toA frP frQ frA =
let (!(Commit b), frP) = rd frP in
wr Receipt→ toQ ;
let (!Open, frP) = rd frP in
wr (Opened b)→ toQ
The functionality simply waits for the committer P to commit to some bit b, notifies the
receiver Q that it has taken place, and reveals b to Q upon request by P . Notice that Q
never actually sees a commitment to b (only the (Receipt) message), so the three properties
(hiding, binding, and non-malleability) hold trivially.
Our development follows closely from the psuedocode in the UC literature [21], which we
show here in Protocol 4.1. In ILC, the committer and receiver are defined like so:
commier :: ∀ ... . Nat→ [Bit]→ · · ·( 1
let commier k bits crupt toZ toF toQ frZ frF frQ =
let (!(Commit b), frZ)= rd frZ in
wr GetCRS→ toF ;
let (!(PublicStrings σ pk0pk1), frF) = rd frF in
let r = take k bits in
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Protocol 4.1: Universally Composable Commitment
1 Public strings:
2 σ: Random string in {0, 1}4n
3 pk0, pk1: Keys for generator Gk : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}4n
4 Commit(b):
5 r ← {0, 1}n
6 y := Gpkb(r)
7 if b = 1 then y := y ⊕ σ
8 Send (Commit, y) to receiver.
9 Upon receiving (Commit, y) from A, B outputs (Receipt).
10 Decommit(x):
11 Send (b, r) to receiver.
12 Receiver checks y = Gpkb(r) for b = 0, or y = Gpkb(r)⊕ σ for b = 1. If
verification succeeds, then B outputs (Open, b).
let x = if b == 0 then prg pk0 r
else xors (prg pk1 r) σ in
wr Commit' x→ toQ ;
let (!Open, frZ)= rd frZ in
wr (Open' b r)→ toQ
receiver :: ∀ ... . Nat→ [Bit]→ · · ·( 1
let receiver k bits crupt toZ toF toP frZ frF frP =
let (!(Commit' x), frP) = rd frP in
wr GetCRS→ toF ;
let (!(PublicStrings σ pk0pk1), frF) = rd frF in
wr Receipt→ toZ ;
let (!(Open' b r), frP) = rd frP in
if (b == 0 && x == prg pk0 r) ||
(b == 1 && x == xors (prg pk1 r) σ)
then wr (Opened b)→ toZ
else error "Cannot occur in honest case."
The protocol also relies on the CRS functionality:
fCrs :: ∀ a ... . Nat→ [Bit]→ Crupt→ · · · a
let fCrs k bits crupt toP toQ toA frP frQ frA =
let (σ, bits) = sample (4∗k) bits in
let (r0, bits) = sample k bits in
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let (r1, bits) = sample k bits in
let pk0 = kgen k r0 in
let pk1 = kgen k r1 in
let pub = PublicStrings σ pk0 pk1 in
let replyCrs to fr = loop (λ _ . wr pub→ to) fr in
replyCrs toP frP
|B replyCrs toQ frQ
|B replyCrs toA frA
To briefly summarize what is going on: the setup CRS samples a random string σ and two
trapdoor pseudorandom generators (prgs pk0, pk1). To commit to the bit b, the commiter
produces a string y that is the result of applying one or the other of the prgs, and if b = 1
additionally applying xor with σ. The intuitive explanation why this is hiding is that without
the trapdoor, it is difficult to tell whether a random 4k-bit string is in the range of either
prg. To open the commitment, the committer simply reveals the preimage and the receiver
checks which of the two cases applies. The intuitive explanation why this is binding is that
it is difficult to find a pair y, y ⊕ σ that are respectively in the range of both prgs.
Defining the simulator. The UC proof consists of two simulators, one for the ideal
world and one for the real world. The ideal world simulator is ported directly from the UC
literature [21]:
simI :: Nat→ [Bit]→ Crupt→ · · ·( 1
let simI k bits crupt toZ toF toP toQ frZ frF frP frQ =
let (pk0,td0) = kgen k in
let (pk1,td1) = kgen k in
let (r0, bits) = sample k bits in
let (r1, bits) = sample k bits in
let σ = xors (prg pk0 r0) (prg pk1 r1) in
match crupt with
| CruptP⇒
let (!GetCRS, frZ) = rd frZ in
wr (X2Z (PublicStrings σ pk0 pk1))→toZ ;
let (!(A2P (Commit' y)), frZ) = rd frZ in
if check td0 pk0 y then
wr (Commit 0)→ toP
else
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if check td1 pk1 (xors y σ) then
wr (Commit 1)→ toP
else error "Fail" ;
let (!(A2P (Open' b r)), frZ) = rd frZ in
if b == 0 && y == prg pk0 r ||
b == 1 && y == xors (prg pk1 r) σ
then wr Open→ toP
else error "Fail"
| CruptQ⇒
let (!GetCRS, frZ) = rd frZ in
wr (X2Z (PublicStrings σ pk0 pk1))→ toZ ;
let (!Receipt, frQ) = rd frQ in
let y = prg pk0 r0 in
wr (X2Z (Commit' y))→ toZ ;
let (!(Opened b'), frQ) = rd frQ in
if (b' == 0) then
wr (X2Z (Opened' r0))→ toZ
else
wr (X2Z (Opened' r1))→ toZ
| CruptNone⇒ error "Fail"
On the other hand, the non-standard real world simulator is required because our protocol
emulation definition requires simulation in both directions.
simR :: Nat→ [Bit]→ Crupt→ · · ·( 1
let simR k bits crupt toZ toF toP toQ frZ frF frP frQ =
match crupt with
| CruptP⇒
let (!(Commit b), frZ) = rd frZ in
wr GetCRS→ toF ;
let (!(PublicStrings σ pk0 pk1), frF) = rd frF in
let r = take k bits in
let y = if b == 0 then prg pk0 r else xors (prg pk0 r) σ in
wr (Commit' y)→ toQ ;
let (!(Open), frZ)= rd frZ in
wr (Open' b r)→ toQ
| CruptQ⇒
31
let (!(Commit' y), frQ) = rd frQ in
wr Receipt→ toZ ;
let (!(Open' b r), frQ) = rd frQ in
wr (Opened b)→ toZ
| CruptNone⇒ error "Fail"
The key to the ideal world simulator is to allow the simulator to generate its own “fake”
CRS, for which it stores the trapdoors. The string σ is not truly random, but instead is the
result of combining two evaluations of the prgs. The ideal world simulator consists of two
cases, depending on which of the parties is corrupt.
In the case that the committer P is corrupt, the simulator needs to be able to extract the
committed value. The simulator is activated when Z sends a message (Commit′ y); in the
real world, this is relayed by the dummy adversary to Q, who outputs Commied back to the
environment. Hence to achieve the same effect in the ideal word, the simulator must send
(Commit b) to FCom. To extract b from y, the simulator makes use of the prg trapdoor check
which one has y in its range. It is necessary to argue by cryptographic reduction that this
simulation is sound. To show this, we would define an alternative execution where the prg is
substituted for a truly random function (i.e., a random oracle). If an environment Z could
distinguish between these two worlds, then we could adapt the execution to distinguish the
prg from random, violating the prg assumption.
In the case that the receiver Q is corrupt, the simulator needs to equivocate. The simulator
is activated when Z inputs (Commit b) to P, after which FCom sends Committed to the
simulator. In the real world, the environment receives a commitment message (Commit′ y)
from corrupted Q for some seemingly-random y. To achieve the same effect, the simulator
must choose y. However, the simulator is next activated when the Z inputs (Open b) to P,
after which the simulator learns b from FCom. However, in the real world the environment
receives a valid opening (Opened′ b r) that is consistent with y and with the value chosen by
the environment. Thus the simulator must initially choose y so that it can later be opened
to either value b may take. The simulator achieves this by choosing σ and y ahead of time
while generating the fake CRS. The reduction step is the same, and involves replacing prg
with a true random function.
Recall that the motivation for the real world simulator is to rule out degenerate protocols
that diverge in some way. For every well behaved environment such that the ideal world is
PPT, we need to demonstrate an adversary in the real world that is also PPT. Fortunately,
the real world simulator is much simpler than ideal world simulator. Essentially the simulator
runs a copy of the honest protocol for each of the corrupted parties. The simulation that
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results in this case is identical.
Relational argument. The goal of the relational analysis is to show that an environment’s
output in the real world is indistinguishable from its output in the ideal world. The proof
follows the one in Canetti and Fischlin [21].
Proof Sketch. Consider the following ensembles:
DR = D(execUC Z (commier, receiver) fCrs dummyA)
D′R = D(execUC Z (commier, receiver) bCrs dummyA)
DI = D(execUC Z (dummyP, dummyQ) fCom simI)
The ensemble DR is over the output of Z in a real world execution. The ensemble D′R is
similar, except Z runs with a bad functionality bCrs that computes fake public strings in
the same way that the simulator does.
bCrs :: ∀ a ... . Nat→ [Bit]→ Crupt→ · · · a
let bCrs k bits crupt toP toQ toA frP frQ frA =
let (r0, bits) = sample k bits in
let (r1, bits) = sample k bits in
let pk0 = kgen k r0 in
let pk1 = kgen k r1 in
let σ = xors (prg pk0 r0) (prg pk1 r1)
let pub = PublicStrings σ pk0 pk1 in
let replyCrs to fr = loop (λ _ . wr pub→ to) fr in
replyCrs toP frP
|B replyCrs toQ frQ
|B replyCrs toA frA
The ensemble DI is over the output of Z in an ideal world execution. The goal is to show
that DR ∼ DI . The proof proceeds by first showing that breaking the pseudorandomness
of the PRG reduces to distinguishing between DR and D′R (hence, DR ∼ D′R), and then
by showing that breaking the pseudorandomness of the PRG also reduces to distinguishing
between D′R and DI (hence, D′R ∼ DI). By the transitivity of indistinguishability, we have
that DR ∼ DI . QED.
Here, ILC’s confluence property plays a critical role: It is necessary for defining the proba-
bility ensembles DR, D′R, and DI , without which we would not be able to obtain a reduction
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from some computationally hard problem to distinguishing the real world and ideal world
ensembles.
4.6 REENTRANCY IN SAUCY
Camenisch et al. [23] recently identified subtleties in defining UC ideal functionalities (re-
lated to reentrancy and the scheduling of concurrent code) such that several functionalities
in the literature are ambiguous as ITMs. Although concerning, these issues have no crypto-
graphic flavor, and so they are better addressed from a PL standpoint. To illustrate, consider
the following (untypeable) ILC process reentrantF, which allows an adversary A to control
the delivery schedule of messages from P to Q (i.e., an asynchronous channel):
loop :: ∀ a b . (a→ b)→ Rd a( b
letrec loop f frS = let (!v, frS) = rd frS in f v; loop f frS
let reentrantF ... frP frA =
loop (λ msg . (let (!Ok, frA) = rd frA in wr msg→ toQ)
|B wr msg→ toA) frP
After receiving input from party P , it notifies the adversary, then forks a background
thread to wait for Ok before delivering the message. This introduces a race condition:
Suppose input message m1 is sent by P , but then A, before sending Ok, instead returns
control to Z, which passes P a second input m2. Now there are two queued messages.
Which one gets delivered when the adversary sends Ok?
To resolve this issue, notice that reentrantF is untypeable in ILC. The race condition
occurs because the read endpoint frA is duplicated (appears free in an unrestricted function).
Camenisch et al. [23] identified several strategies for resolving this problem in UC, which in
turn are expressible ILC. One approach is to make the process explicitly sequential, such
that the arrival of a second message before the first is delivered causes execution to get stuck:
letrec sequentialF ... frP frA =
let (!msg, frP) = rd frP in
wr msg→ toA ;
let (!Ok, frA) = rd frA in
wr msg→ toQ ;
sequentialF ... frP frA
Alternatively, we may discard such messages arriving out of order, returning them to sender;
we express this in ILC using the external choice operator:
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letrec discardingF ... frP frA =
let (!msg, frP) = rd frP in
wr msg→ toA ;
letrec iloop () frP frA =
choice
| (_,frP,frA)@(rd frP)⇒ wr Discard→ toP ;
iloop () frP frA
| (_,frP,frA)@(rd frA)⇒ wr msg→ toQ ;
discardingF ... frP frA
in iloop () frP frA
Ultimately, Camenisch et al. propose a different strategy, which is to restrict how the
environment/adversary respond to certain “urgent” messages that are used to exchange meta-
information (modeling related messages). That is, upon receiving an urgent message from
process P , the environment (or adversary) must return control back to P immediately.
Modeling this solution is left as future work, but ILC provides an ideal starting point—
restrictions on the environment/adversary could be expressed by behavior refinements: upon
receiving an urgent message from P , the environment (or adversary) must not send a message
on its other channels before sending a message to P .
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CHAPTER 5: RELATED WORK
5.1 PROCESS CALCULI
Process calculi have a long and rich history. ILC occupies a point in this space that
is particularly suited to faithfully capturing interactive Turing machines (and hence, com-
putational cryptography), but plenty of existing calculi are also cryptographically-flavored
and/or enjoy similar properties to ILC. We survey some of them here.
With symbolic semantics. Two early adaptations of process calculi for reasoning about
cryptographic protocols were the spi calculus [6] and the applied π-calculus [9], both of which
extend the π-calculus with cryptographic operations [7]. Symbolic UC [4] is a simulation-
based security framework in this setting. However, protocols proven secure in the symbolic
setting may not be realizable with any cryptographic primitives based on hardness assump-
tions.
With computational semantics. Naturally, ensuing work has turned to bridging the
gap between this PL-style of formalization and the computational model of cryptography
by outfitting these calculi with a computational semantics. Lincoln et al. [10] give a compu-
tational semantics to a variant of the π-calculus, which allows one to define communicating
probabilistic polynomial-time processes; Mateus et al. [24] adapts their calculus to explore
(sequential) compositionality properties in protocols. A drawback of these protocols is that
they embed probabilistic choices directly into the definition—essentially when faced with
nondeterminism, each path has equal probability. Laud [25] gives a computational seman-
tics to the spi calculus, which additionally includes a type system for ensuring well-typed
protocols preserve the secrecy of messages given to it by users.
With confluence. There are a number of other process calculi that enjoy confluence.
Berger et al. [26] describe a type system for capturing deterministic (sequential) computa-
tion in the π-calculus. The type system uses affineness and stateless replication to achieve
deterministic computation. Fowler et al. [12] present a core linear lambda calculus with
(binary) session-typed channels and exception handling that enjoys confluence and termi-
nation. The calculus only considers two-party protocols, so for our multiparty setting, ILC
requires a sophisticated type system to achieve confluence.
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5.2 TOOLS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS
Computer-aided tools for cryptographic analysis operate in either the symbolic model or
the computational model. The survey by Blanchet [27] highlights some of their differences.
The symbolic tools include the NRL protocol analyzer [28], Maude-NPA [29], Proverif [30],
and Tamarin [31]. In the symbolic setting, cryptographic operations are abstracted as term
algebras (a variant of the applied π-calculus in the case of Proverif), and adversary capabil-
ities are nondeterministic applications of deduction rules over these terms. Here, nondeter-
minism allows the adversary to find attack traces (if there are any), whereas the presence
of nondeterminism in the computational setting would frustrate cryptographic reduction
proofs.
The computational tools include CertiCrypt [32], EasyCrypt [5], CryptoVerif [33], and
CryptHOL [34]. Although these tools focus on game-based security, which, in contrast to
simulation-based definitions (such as UC), only guarantee security in a standalone setting
(no composition guarantees), recent efforts have used them to mechanize UC-based proofs.
EasyUC [35] uses EasyCrypt to mechanize UC proofs for key exchange and secure commu-
nication. Lochbihler et al. [36] use CryptHOL to formalize the constructive cryptography
framework, an alternative formulation of universally composable security [37].
5.3 VARIATIONS OF UNIVERSAL COMPOSABILITY
A number of models for universal composability have been proposed in the literature [1,
38, 18, 14, 39, 40, 37, 17, 4, 13, 23, 41, 42]. We highlight a few that have similar goals to
ours.
In contrast with UC, which uses ITMs as its computational model, the reactive sim-
ulatability framework (RSIM) [14] uses probabilistic IO automata, which are amenable to
automated reasoning. In contrast with RSIM, ILC is intended to be the basis for a convenient
and flexible programming language to which we can easily port existing UC pseudocode.
Models based on inexhaustible interactive Turing machines (IITMs) [43, 41] aim to address
drawbacks of UC models for which polynomial time ITMs can be “exhausted” (by having
other machines send useless messages, forcing them to halt). In turn, models with exhaustible
ITMs are less expressive. Because IITMs maintain the “single-threaded” execution semantics
of ITMs, ILC can be used to build a concrete programming model for IITM-based frameworks
as well.
The abstract cryptography framework [40] advocates a top-down approach: developing
theory at an abstract level (ignoring low level details such as computational models and
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complexity notions) to simplify definitions. While we stick to a bottom-up approach, we
aim to simplify UC via PL formalisms.
Simplified universal composability (SUC) [17] gives a simpler and restricted variant of
the UC framework. The main difference from vanilla UC [1] is that the set of parties is
fixed, which greatly simplifies polynomial time reasoning and protocol composition while
maintaining the same strong properties. We follow this in our execUC implementation.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
The universal composability (UC) framework is widely used in cryptography for proofs.
SaUCy takes a step towards mechanizing UC as a programming framework for constructing
and analyzing large systems. We envision using SaUCy to tackle, for example, applica-
tions involving blockchains and smart contracts [44, 45, 46], which comprise an array of
cryptography and distributed computing components and suffer from increasingly unwieldy
formalisms.
We can view ILC typechecking of simulators in SaUCy as a partial mechanization of UC
proofs, though the indistinguishability analysis is still on paper. Even partial mechanization
is useful for catching bugs; we imagine using SaUCy to systematically implement function-
alities and protocols from the literature and fuzz test them. Future work would be to embed
ILC within a mechanized proof system, such as F∗ or EasyCrypt.
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APPENDIX A: INTERACTIVE LAMBDA CALCULUS
A.1 ALGORITHMIC TYPING RULES
∆in; Γ ` e : U a ∆out
Under input contexts ∆in and Γ, expression e has type U
and output context ∆out.
∆; Γ, x : A ` x : A a ∆ uvar ∆, x : X; Γ ` x : X a ∆ avar ∆; Γ ` () : 1 a ∆ unit
∆1; Γ ` e1 : A1 a ∆2
∆2; Γ ` e2 : A2 a ∆3
∆1; Γ ` (e1, e2)∞ : A1×A2 a ∆3
upair
∆1; Γ ` e1 : S1 a ∆2
∆2; Γ ` e2 : S2 a ∆3
∆1; Γ ` (e1, e2)w : S1× S2 a ∆3
spair
∆1; Γ ` e1 : X1 a ∆2
∆2; Γ ` e2 : X2 a ∆3
∆1; Γ ` (e1, e2)1 : X1 ⊗X2 a ∆3
apair
i ∈ {1, 2}
∆1; Γ ` e : Ai a ∆2
∆1; Γ ` inji∞(e) : A1 +A2 a ∆2
uinj
i ∈ {1, 2}
∆1; Γ ` e : Si a ∆2
∆1; Γ ` injiw(e) : S1 + S2 a ∆2
sinj
i ∈ {1, 2}
∆1; Γ ` e : Xi a ∆2
∆1; Γ ` inji1(e) : X1 ⊕X2 a ∆2
ainj
∆1; Γ ` e1 : A1×A2 a ∆2
∆2; Γ, x1 : A1, x2 : A2 ` e : U a ∆3
∆1; Γ ` split∞(e1, x1.x2.e2) : U a ∆3
usplit
∆1; Γ ` e1 : S1× S2 a ∆2
∆2; Γ, x1 : S1, x2 : S2 ` e : U a ∆3
∆1; Γ ` splitw(e1, x1.x2.e2) : U a ∆3
ssplit
∆1; Γ ` e1 : X1 ⊗X2 a ∆2
∆2, x1 : X1, x2 : X2; Γ ` e : U a ∆3
∆1; Γ ` split1(e1, x1.x2.e2) : U a ∆3 ÷ (x1 : X1, x2 : X2)
asplit
∆1; Γ ` e : A1 +A2 a ∆2
∆2; Γ, x1 : A1 ` e1 : U a ∆3 ∆2; Γ, x2 : A2 ` e2 : U a ∆3
∆1; Γ ` case∞(e, x1.e1, x2.e2) : U a ∆3
ucase
Figure A.1: Algorithmic typing rules.
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∆1; Γ ` e : S1 + S2 a ∆2
∆2; Γ, x1 : S1 ` e1 : U a ∆3 ∆2; Γ, x2 : S2 ` e2 : U a ∆3
∆1; Γ ` casew(e, x1.e1, x2.e2) : U a ∆3
scase
∆1; Γ ` e : X1 ⊕X2 a ∆2
∆2, x1 : X1; Γ ` e1 : U a ∆3 ∆2, x2 : X2; Γ ` e2 : U a ∆3
∆1; Γ ` case1(e, x1.e1, x2.e2) : U a ∆3 ÷ (x1 : X1, x2 : X2)
acase
·; Γ, x : A ` e : U a ·
∆; Γ ` λ∞ x. e : A→∞ U a ∆
uabs
w ; Γ, x : A ` e : U a ·
∆; Γ ` λw x. e : A→w U a ∆
wabs
∆1, x : X; Γ ` e : U a ∆2
∆1; Γ ` λ1 x. e : X →1 U a ∆2 ÷ (x : X)
aabs
∆1; Γ ` e2 : A a ∆2
∆2; Γ ` e1 : A→∞ U a ∆3
∆1; Γ ` (e1 e2)∞ : U a ∆3
uapp
∆1; Γ ` e2 : A a ∆2
∆2; Γ ` e1 : A→w U a ∆3
∆1, w ; Γ ` (e1 e2)w : U a ∆3
wapp
∆1; Γ ` e2 : X a ∆2
∆2; Γ ` e1 : X →1 U a ∆3
∆1; Γ ` (e1 e2)1 : U a ∆3
aapp
·; Γ, x : A→∞ U ` e : A→∞ U a ·
∆; Γ ` fix∞(x.e) : A→∞ U a ∆
ufix
·; Γ, x : A→w U ` e : A→w U a ·
∆; Γ ` fixw(x.e) : A→w U a ∆
wfix
x : X →1 U ; Γ ` e : X →1 U a ·
∆; Γ ` fix1(x.e) : X →1 U a ∆
afix
∆1; Γ ` e1 : A a ∆2
∆2; Γ, x : A ` e2 : U a ∆3
∆1; Γ ` let∞(e1, x.e2) : U a ∆3
ulet
∆1; Γ ` e1 : X a ∆2
∆2, x : X; Γ ` e2 : U a ∆3
∆1; Γ ` let1(e1, x.e2) : U a ∆3 ÷ (x : X)
alet
∆1; Γ ` e : A a ∆2
∆1; Γ ` ! e : !A a ∆2
bang
∆1; Γ ` e : !A a ∆2
∆1; Γ ` ¡ e : A a ∆2
gnab
∆1, x1 : RdS; Γ, x2 : WrS ` e : U a ∆2
∆1; Γ ` ν(x1, x2). e : U a ∆2 ÷ (x1 : RdS)
nu
∆1; Γ ` e1 : S a ∆2
∆2; Γ ` e2 : WrS a ∆3
∆1, w ; Γ ` wr(e1, e2) : 1 a ∆3
wr
w 6∈ ∆2 ∆1; Γ ` e1 : RdS a ∆2
∆2, w , x : !S ⊗ RdS; Γ ` e2 : U a ∆3
∆1; Γ ` rd(e1, x.e2) : U a ∆3 ÷ (w , x : !S ⊗ RdS)
rd
Figure A.2: Algorithmic typing rules continued.
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w 6∈ ∆3 ∆1; Γ ` e1 : RdS a ∆2 ∆2; Γ ` e2 : RdT a ∆3
∆3, w , x1 : !S ⊗ RdS ⊗ RdT ; Γ ` e3 : U a ∆4
∆3, w , x2 : !T ⊗ RdS ⊗ RdT ; Γ ` e4 : U a ∆4
∆1; Γ ` ch(e1, x1.e3, e2, x2.e4) : U a ∆4 ÷
(w , x1 : !S ⊗ RdS ⊗ RdT , x2 : !T ⊗ RdT ⊗ RdS)
choice
∆1; Γ ` e1 : U a ∆2
∆2; Γ ` e2 : V a ∆3
∆1; Γ ` e1 |B e2 : V a ∆3
fork
Figure A.3: Algorithmic typing rules continued again.
A.2 TYPE SOUNDNESS
We first define syntax for process and channel typings, which each map a kind of identifier
(process name or channel name) to its associated type:
Process pool typings Φ ::= · | Φ, p : U
Channel typings Ψ ::= · | Ψ, d : S
Using the syntax above, we define configuration typing as a straightforward extension of
single-process typing, given in Section 3.2:
Ψ ` C : Φ Configuration C is well-typed.
Ψ ` 〈Σ; ε〉 : ·
empty
Ψ ` e : U Ψ ` 〈Σ;π〉 : Φ
Ψ ` 〈Σ; π, p : e〉 : Φ, (p : U)
cons
A.2.1 Progress
Progress for the functional fragment of ILC (local progress) is fairly standard. We follow
the usual recipe, except that we give a special definition of local process termination:










In other words, e lterm holds when e is a value, is reading (either as a standalone read or
an external choice), or is writing.
Lemma A.1 (Local Progress). If Ψ ` e : U , then either e lterm or there exists e′ such that
e→ e′.
Proof. By structural induction on the derivation of Ψ ` e : U . QED.
To state progress on configurations, we give a special definition of “program termination”
that permits deadlocks:
C term Configuration C is terminated.
∀(p : e) ∈ π. e lterm
RdChans(π) = Σ1 WrChans(π) = Σ2
{(c1, c2) | c1 ∈ Σ1, c2 ∈ Σ2, c2  c1} = ∅
〈Σ; π〉 term
Cterm
RdChans(ε) = · (A.1)
WrChans(ε) = · (A.2)
RdChans(π, p : E[rd(c, x.e)]) = RdChans(π), c (A.3)
WrChans(π, p : E[rd(c, x.e)]) = WrChans(π) (A.4)
RdChans(π, p : E[ch(c1, x1.e1, c2, x2.e2)]) = RdChans(π), c1, c2 (A.5)
WrChans(π, p : E[ch(c1, x1.e1, c2, x2.e2)]) = WrChans(π) (A.6)
RdChans(π, p : E[wr(v, c)]) = RdChans(π) (A.7)
WrChans(π, p : E[wr(v, c)]) = WrChans(π), c (A.8)
RdChans(π, p : v) = RdChans(π) (A.9)
WrChans(π, p : v) = WrChans(π) (A.10)
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In other words, C term holds when either:
1. C is fully normal: Every process in C is normalized (consists of a value), or
2. C is (at least partially) deadlocked: Some (possibly empty) portion of C is normal,
and there exists one or more reading processes in C, or there exists one or more writing
processes in C, however, no reader-writer process pair exists for a common channel.
Theorem A.1 (Progress). If Ψ ` C : Φ, then either C term or there exists C ′ such that
C −→ C ′.
Proof. By structural induction on the derivation of Ψ ` C : Φ.
Case A.1.1.
Ψ ` 〈Σ; ε〉 : ·
empty
∀(p : e) ∈ ε. e lterm (Vacuous)
Σ1 = RdChans(ε) = · (By definition of RdChans)
Σ2 = WrChans(ε) = · (By definition of WrChans)
{(c1, c2) | c1 ∈ Σ1, c2 ∈ Σ2, c2  c1} = ∅
〈Σ; ε〉 term (By rule Cterm)
Case A.1.2.
Ψ ` e : U Ψ ` 〈Σ;π〉 : Φ
Ψ ` 〈Σ; π, p : e〉 : Φ, (p : U)
cons
e lterm or ∃ e′ s.t. e→ e′
(By i.h.)
〈Σ; π〉 term or ∃ 〈Σ′; π′〉 s.t. 〈Σ; π〉 → 〈Σ′; π′〉
(By i.h.)
Subcase ∃ e′ s.t. e→ e′
Subsubcase local
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e = E[e1] and e′ = E[e2]
(Suppose)
〈Σ;π, p : E[e1]〉 → 〈Σ; π, p : E[e2]〉
(By rule local)
Subsubcase fork
e = E[e1 |B e2], e′ = E[e2], and q 6∈ Σ
(Suppose)
〈Σ; π, p : E[e1 |B e2]〉 → 〈Σ, q; π, q : e1, p : E[e2]〉
(By rule fork)
Subsubcase nu
e = E[ν(x1, x2). e1], e
′ = E[[Read(d)/x1][Write(d)/x2]e1], d 6∈ Σ
(Suppose)
〈Σ; π, p : [ν(x1, x2). e1]〉 → 〈Σ, d; π, p : E[[Read(d)/x1][Write(d)/x2]e1]〉
(By rule nu)
Subsubcase rw
e = E[rd(c1, x.e1)], e′ = E[[(!v, c1)1/x]e1], and c2  c1, or
e = E[wr(v, c2)], e′ = E[()], and c2  c1
Subsubsubcase e = E[rd(c1, x.e1)], e′ = E[[(!v, c1)1/x]e1], and c2  c1
∃ (q : E[wr(v, c2)]) ∈ π
(By c2  c1)
〈Σ;π, p : E[rd(c1, x.e1)]→ 〈Σ;π, p : E[[(!v, c1)1/x]e1]〉〉
(By rule rw)
Subsubsubcase e = E[wr(v, c2)], e′ = E[()], and c2  c1
∃ (q : E[rd(c1, x.e1)]) ∈ π
(By c2  c1)
〈Σ; π, p : E[wr(v, c2)]→ 〈Σ; π, p : E[()]〉〉
(By rule rw)
Subsubcase cw
e = E[ch(c1, x1.e1, c2, x2.e2)], e′ = E[[(!v, c1, c2)1/xi]ei], c ci, i ∈ {1, 2}, or
e = E[wr(v, c)], e′ = E[()], c ci, i ∈ {1, 2}
Subsubsubcase e = E[ch(c1, x1.e1, c2, x2.e2)], e′ = E[[(!v, c1, c2)1/xi]ei],
c ci, i ∈ {1, 2}
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∃ (q : E[wr(v, c)]) ∈ π
(By c ci)
〈Σ;π, p : E[ch(c1, x1.e1, c2, x2.e2)]→ 〈Σ; π, p : E[[(!v, c1, c2)1/xi]ei]〉〉
(By rule cw)
Subsubsubcase e = E[wr(v, c)], e′ = E[()], c ci, i ∈ {1, 2}
∃ (q : E[ch(c1, x1.e1, c2, x2.e2)]) ∈ π
(By c ci)
〈Σ;π, p : E[wr(v, c)]→ 〈Σ;π, p : E[()]〉〉
(By rule cw)
Subcase ∃ 〈Σ′; π′〉 s.t. 〈Σ;π〉 → 〈Σ′; π′〉
〈Σ; π, p : e〉 → 〈Σ′; π′, p : e〉
(By rules local and congr)
Subcase 〈Σ; p : e〉 term and 〈Σ; π〉 term
Σ1 = RdChans(π, p : e) and Σ2 = WrChans(π, p : e)
(Suppose)
{(c1, c2) | c1 ∈ Σ1, c2 ∈ Σ2, c2  c1} = ∅ or
{(c1, c2) | c1 ∈ Σ1, c2 ∈ Σ2, c2  c1} 6= ∅
Subsubcase {(c1, c2) | c1 ∈ Σ1, c2 ∈ Σ2, c2  c1} = ∅
〈Σ;π, p : e〉 term
(By rule Cterm)
Subsubcase {(c1, c2) | c1 ∈ Σ1, c2 ∈ Σ2, c2  c1} 6= ∅
∃ c2  c1 s.t. c1 ∈ Σ1, c2 ∈ Σ2
(Above)
p : v or p : E[rd(c1, x.e)] or p : E[ch(c1, x1.e1, c3, x2.e2)] or
p : E[ch(c3, x1.e1, c1, x2.e2)] or p : E[wr(v, c2)]
(By definition of lterm)
Subsubsubcase p : v
(Impossible)
Subsubsubcase p : E[rd(c1, x.e)]
∃ q : E[wr(v, c2)] ∈ π
(By c2  c1)
〈Σ; π, p : E[rd(c1, x.e)]〉 −→ 〈Σ; π, p : E[[(!v, c1)1/x]e]〉
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(By rule rw)
Subsubsubcase p : E[ch(c1, x1.e1, c3, x2.e2)]
∃ q : E[wr(v, c2)] ∈ π
(By c2  c1)
〈Σ;π, p : E[ch(c1, x1.e1, c3, x2.e2)]〉 −→ 〈Σ; π, p : E[[(!v, c1, c3)1/x1]e1]〉
(By rule cw)
Subsubsubcase p : E[ch(c3, x1.e1, c1, x2.e2)]
∃ q : E[wr(v, c2)] ∈ π
(By c2  c1)
〈Σ;π, p : E[ch(c3, x1.e1, c1, x2.e2)]〉 −→ 〈Σ; π, p : E[[(!v, c1, c3)1/x2]e2]〉
(By rule cw)
Subsubsubcase p : E[wr(v, c2)]
∃ q : E[rd(c1, x.e)] ∈ π or ∃ q : E[ch(c1, x1.e1, c3, x2.e2)] ∈ π or
∃ q : E[ch(c3, x1.e1, c1, x2.e2)] ∈ π
(By c2  c1)




Preservation for the functional fragment of ILC (local preservation) is standard.
Lemma A.2 (Local Preservation). If Ψ ` e : U and e → e′, then there exists Ψ′ ⊇ Ψ such
that Ψ ` e′ : U .
Proof. By structural induction on the derivation of e→ e′. QED.
To state preservation on configurations, we first state several auxiliary results, which follow
the formulation of Gay and Vasconcelos [47]. Lemma A.3 shows that typing of configurations
is preserved under configuration equivalence.
Lemma A.3 (Preservation Modulo Equivalence). If Ψ ` C : Φ and C ≡ C ′, then Ψ ` C ′ : Φ.
Proof. By structural induction on Ψ ` C : Φ. QED.
47
Lemma A.4 shows that a subterm of a well-typed evaluation context is typeable with a
subset of the type contexts.
Lemma A.4 (Typeability of Subterms). If D is a derivation of Ψ; ∆; Γ ` E[e] : U (written
D :: Ψ; ∆; Γ ` E[e] : U), then
1. there exists Ψ1,Ψ2; ∆1,∆2; Γ1,Γ2 and V such that Ψ = Ψ1,Ψ2, ∆ = ∆1,∆2, Γ = Γ1,Γ2,
2. D has a subderivation D′ (written D′ v D) concluding Ψ1; ∆1; Γ1 ` e : V ,
3. the position of D′ in D corresponds to the position of the hole in E (written E[D′ v D]).
Proof. By structural induction on the structure of E. QED.
Lemma A.5 shows that the subterm of a well-typed evaluation context can be replaced.
Lemma A.5 (Replacement (Evaluation Contexts)). If
1. D :: Ψ1,Ψ2; ∆1,∆2; Γ1,Γ2 ` E[e] : U ,
2. D′ v D such that D′ :: Ψ2; ∆2; Γ2 ` e : V ,
3. E[D′ v D],
4. Ψ3; ∆3; Γ3 ` e′ : V ,
5. Ψ1,Ψ3; ∆1,∆3; Γ1,Γ3 is defined,
then Ψ1,Ψ3; ∆1,∆3; Γ1,Γ3 ` E[e′] : U .
Proof. By structural induction on the structure of E. QED.
Finally, Lemmas A.6, A.7, A.8, A.9 show that typing of terms is preserved by substitution.
Lemma A.6 (Substitution (Unrestricted)). If
1. Ψ1; ∆1; Γ1, x : A ` e : U ,
2. Ψ2; ∆2; Γ2 ` e′ : A,
3. Ψ1,Ψ2; ∆1,∆2; Γ1,Γ2 is defined,
then Ψ1,Ψ2; ∆1,∆2; Γ1,Γ2 ` [e′/x]e : U .
Proof. By structural induction on the derivation of Ψ1; ∆1; Γ1, x : A ` e : U . QED.
Lemma A.7 (Substitution (Affine)). If
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1. Ψ1; ∆1, x : X; Γ1 ` e : U ,
2. Ψ2; ∆2; Γ2 ` e′ : X,
3. Ψ1,Ψ2; ∆1,∆2; Γ1,Γ2 is defined,
then Ψ1,Ψ2; ∆1,∆2; Γ1,Γ2 ` [e′/x]e : U .
Proof. By structural induction on the derivation of Ψ1; ∆1, x : X; Γ1 ` e : U . QED.
Lemma A.8 (Substitution (Read Endpoint)). If
1. Ψ; ∆, x : RdS; Γ ` e : U ,
2. Ψ, d : S; ∆; Γ is defined,
then Ψ, d : S; ∆; Γ ` [Read(d)/x]e : U .
Proof. By structural induction on the derivation of Ψ; ∆, x : RdS; Γ ` e : U . QED.
Lemma A.9 (Substitution (Write Endpoint)). If
1. Ψ; ∆; Γ, x : WrS ` e : U ,
2. Ψ, d : S,Ψ; ∆; Γ is defined,
then Ψ, d : S; ∆; Γ ` [Write(d)/x]e : U .
Proof. By structural induction on the derivation of Ψ; ∆; Γ, x : WrS ` e : U . QED.
Theorem A.2 (Preservation). If Ψ ` C : Φ and C −→ C ′, then there exists Ψ′ ⊇ Ψ and
Φ′ ⊇ Φ such that Ψ′ ` C ′ : Φ′.
Proof. By structural induction on the derivation of C −→ C ′.
Case A.2.1.
e1 −→ e2
〈Σ; π, p : E[e1]〉 −→ 〈Σ; π, p : E[e2]〉
local
Ψ ` 〈Σ; π, p : E[e1]〉 : Φ s.t. Φ = Φπ, p : U,
Ψ = Ψ1,Ψ2, and D :: Ψ1,Ψ2 ` E[e1] : U (Assumption)
∃ D′ v D s.t. D′ :: Ψ2 ` e1 : V and E[D′ v D] (By Lemma A.4)
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Ψ2 ` e2 : V (By i.h. and Lemma A.2)
Ψ1,Ψ2 `E[e2] : U (By Lemma A.5)
Ψ `E[e2] : U (By above equalities)
Ψ ` 〈Σ; π〉 : Φπ (Above)
Ψ ` 〈Σ; π, p : E[e2]〉 : (Φπ, p : U) (By rule cons)
Ψ ` 〈Σ; π, p : E[e2]〉 : Φ (By above equalities)
Ψ′ = Ψ and Φ′ = Φ (Suppose)
Ψ′ ` 〈Σ; π, p : E[e2]〉 : Φ′ (By above equalities)
Case A.2.2.
q /∈ Σ
〈Σ; π, p : E[e1 |B e2]〉 −→ 〈Σ, q; π, q : e1, p : E[e2]〉
fork
Ψ ` 〈Σ; π, p : E[e1 |B e2]〉 : Φ s.t. Φ = Φπ, p : U,
Ψ = Ψ1,Ψ2, and D :: Ψ1,Ψ2 ` E[e1 |B e2] : U (Assumption)
∃ D′ v D s.t. D′ :: Ψ2 ` e1 |B e2 : V2 and E[D′ v D] (By Lemma A.4)
Ψ2 ` e1 : V1 (By inversion on fork)
Ψ2 ` e2 : V2 (By inversion on fork)
Ψ1,Ψ2 `E[e2] : U (By Lemma A.5)
Ψ `E[e2] : U (By above equalities)
Ψ ` 〈Σ; π〉 : Φπ (Above)
Ψ ` 〈Σ, q; π〉 : Φπ (By q 6∈ Σ)
Ψ ` 〈Σ, q; π, q : e1〉 : (Φπ, q : V1) (By rule cons)
Ψ ` 〈Σ, q; π, q : e1, p : E[e2]〉 : (Φπ, q : V1, p : U) (By rule cons)
Ψ ` 〈Σ, q; π, q : e1, p : E[e2]〉 : Φ, q : V1 (By above equalities)
Ψ′ = Ψ and Φ′ = Φ, q : V1 (Suppose)
Ψ′ ` 〈Σ, q; π, q : e1, p : E[e2]〉 : Φ′ (By above equalities)
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Case A.2.3.
C1 ≡ C ′1 C ′1 −→ C ′2 C ′2 ≡ C2
C1 −→ C2
congr
Ψ `C1 : Φ (Assumption)
C1 ≡ C ′1 (Given)
Ψ `C ′1 : Φ (By Lemma A.3)
Ψ′ ⊇ Ψ and Φ′ ⊇ Φ (Suppose)
Ψ′ `C ′2 : Φ′ (By i.h.)
Ψ′ `C2 : Φ′ (By Lemma A.3)
Case A.2.4.
d /∈ Σ
〈Σ;π, p : E[ν(x1, x2). e]〉 −→ 〈Σ, d; π, p : E[[Read(d)/x1][Write(d)/x2]e]〉
nu
Ψ ` 〈Σ; π, p : E[ν(x1, x2). e]〉 : Φ s.t. Φ = Φπ, p : U,
Ψ = Ψ1,Ψ2 and D :: Ψ1,Ψ2 ` E[ν(x1, x2). e] : U
(Assumption)
∃ D′ v D s.t. D′ :: Ψ2 ` ν(x1, x2). e : V and E[D′ v D]
(By Lemma A.4)
Ψ2; Γ; ∆ ` e : U where Γ; ∆ = x1 : RdS;x2 : WrS
(By inversion on nu)
d : S `Read(d) : RdS
(By rule rdend)
d : S `Write(d) : RdS
(By rule wrend)
Ψ3 ` [Read(d)/x1][Write(d)/x2]e : U where Ψ3 = Ψ2, d : S
(By Lemmas A.8 and A.9)
Ψ1,Ψ3 `E[[Read(d)/x1][Write(d)/x2]e] : Up
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(By Lemma A.5)
Ψ,Ψ4 `E[[Read(d)/x1][Write(d)/x2]e] : Up where Ψ4 = c1 : RdS, c2 : WrS
(By above equalities)
Ψ,Ψ4 ` 〈Σ; π〉 : Φπ
(Above)
Ψ,Ψ4 ` 〈Σ; π, p : E[[Read(d)/x1][Write(d)/x2]e]〉 : (Φπ, p : U)
(By rule cons)
Ψ,Ψ4 ` 〈Σ; π, p : E[[Read(d)/x1][Write(d)/x2]e]〉 : Φ
(Above)
Ψ′ = Ψ,Ψ4 and Φ′ = Φ
(Suppose)




〈Σ;π, p : E1[rd(c1, x.e)], q : E2[wr(v, c2)]〉 −→ 〈Σ; π, p : E1[[(!v, c1)1/x]e], q : E2[()]〉
rw
Ψ ` 〈Σ;π, p : E1[rd(c1, x.e)], q : E2[wr(v, c2)]〉 : Φ s.t. Φ = Φπ, p : U, q : V,
Ψ = Ψ1,Ψ2,Dp :: Ψ1,Ψ2 ` E1[rd(c1, x.e)] : U,
Ψ = Ψ3,Ψ4, and Dq :: Ψ3,Ψ4 ` E2[wr(v, c2)] : V
(Assumption)
∃ D′p v Dp s.t. D′p :: Ψ2 ` rd(c1, x.e) : U ′ and E1[D′p v Dp]
(By Lemma A.4)
∃ D′q v Dq s.t. D′q :: Ψ4 ` wr(v, c2) : 1 and E2[D′q v Dq]
(By Lemma A.4)
c2  c1 s.t. Ψ(c2) = WrS and Ψ(c1) = RdS
(Given)
Ψ2; ∆; · ` e : U ′ where ∆ = w , x : !S ⊗ RdS
(By inversion on rd)
` v : S
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(By inversion on wr)
` ! v : !S
(By rule bang)
` (!v, c1)1 : !S ⊗ RdS
(By rule apair)
Ψ2; w ; · ` [(!v, c1)1/x]e : U ′
(By Lemma A.7)
Ψ1,Ψ2 `E1[[(!v, c1)1/x]e] : U
(By Lemma A.5)
Ψ `E1[[(!v, c1)1/x]e] : U
(By above equalities)
Ψ ` 〈Σ;π〉 : Φπ
(Above)
Ψ ` 〈Σ;π, p : E1[[(!v, c1)1/x]e]〉 : (Φπ, p : U)
(By rule cons)
Ψ4 ` () : 1
(By rule unit)
Ψ3,Ψ4 `E2[()] : V
(By Lemma A.5)
Ψ `E2[()] : V
(By above equalities)
Ψ ` 〈Σ;π, p : E1[[(!v, c1)1/x]e], q : E2[()]〉 : (Φπ, p : U, q : V )
(By rule cons)
Ψ ` 〈Σ;π, p : E1[[(!v, c1)1/x]e], q : E2[()]〉 : Φ
(By above equalities)
Ψ′ = Ψ and Φ′ = Φ
(Suppose)




c ci i ∈ {1, 2}
〈Σ;π, p : E1[ch(c1, x1.e1, c2, x2.e2)], q : E2[wr(v, c)]〉 −→
〈Σ; π, p : E1[[(!v, c1, c2)1/xi]ei], q : E2[()]〉
cw
Ψ ` 〈Σ;π, p : E1[ch(c1, x1.e1, c2, x2.e2)], q : E2[wr(v, c)]〉 : Φ
s.t. Φ = Φπ, p : U, q : V,
Ψ = Ψ1,Ψ2,Dp :: Ψ1,Ψ2 ` E1[ch(c1, x1.e1, c2, x2.e2)] : U,
Ψ = Ψ3,Ψ4, and Dq :: Ψ3,Ψ4 ` E2[wr(v, c)] : V
(Assumption)
∃ D′p v Dp s.t. D′p :: Ψ2 ` ch(c1, x1.e1, c2, x2.e2) : U ′ and E1[D′p v Dp]
(By Lemma A.4)
∃ D′q v Dq s.t. D′q :: Ψ4 ` wr(v, c2) : 1 and E2[D′q v Dq]
(By Lemma A.4)
c c1 s.t. Ψ(c) = WrS, Ψ(c1) = RdS, Ψ(c2) = RdT or
c c2 s.t. Ψ(c) = WrT, Ψ(c1) = RdS, Ψ(c2) = RdT
(Given)
Subcase c c1
Ψ2; ∆; · ` e : U ′ where ∆ = w , x1 : !S ⊗ RdS ⊗ RdT
(By inversion on choice)
` v : S
(By inversion on wr)
` ! v : !S
(By rule bang)
` (!v, c1, c2)1 : !S ⊗ RdS ⊗ RdT
(By rule apair)
Ψ2; w ; · ` (!v, c1, c2)1/x1]e1 : U ′
(By Lemma A.7)
Ψ1,Ψ2 `E1[[(!v, c1, c2)1/x1]e1] : U
(By Lemma A.5)
Ψ `E1[[(!v, c1, c2)1/x1]e1] : U
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(By above equalities)
Ψ ` 〈Σ;π〉 : Φπ
(Above)
Ψ ` 〈Σ;π, p : E1[[(!v, c1, c2)1/x1]e1]〉 : (Φπ, p : U)
(By rule cons)
Ψ4 ` () : 1
(By rule unit)
Ψ3,Ψ4 `E2[()] : V
(By Lemma A.5)
Ψ `E2[()] : V
(By above equalities)
Ψ ` 〈Σ;π, p : E1[[(!v, c1, c2)1/x1]e1], q : E2[()]〉 : (Φπ, p : U, q : V )
(By rule cons)
Ψ ` 〈Σ;π, p : E1[[(!v, c1, c2)1/x1]e1], q : E2[()]〉 : Φ
(By above equalities)
Ψ′ = Ψ and Φ′ = Φ
(Suppose)
Ψ′ ` 〈Σ;π, p : E1[[(!v, c1, c2)1/x1]e1], q : E2[()]〉 : Φ′
(By above equalities)
Subcase c c2
Ψ2; ∆; · ` e : U ′ where ∆ = w , x2 : !T ⊗ RdS ⊗ RdT
(By inversion on choice)
` v : T
(By inversion on wr)
` ! v : !T
(By rule bang)
` (!v, c1, c2)1 : !T ⊗ RdS ⊗ RdT
(By rule apair)
Ψ2, w ; · ` (!v, c1, c2)1/x2]e2 : U ′
(By Lemma A.7)
Ψ1,Ψ2 `E1[[(!v, c1, c2)1/x2]e2] : U
(By Lemma A.5)
55
Ψ `E1[[(!v, c1, c2)1/x2]e2] : U
(By above equalities)
Ψ ` 〈Σ;π〉 : Φπ
(Above)
Ψ ` 〈Σ;π, p : E1[[(!v, c1, c2)1/x2]e2]〉 : (Φπ, p : U)
(By rule cons)
Ψ4 ` () : 1
(By rule unit)
Ψ3,Ψ4 `E2[()] : V
(By Lemma A.5)
Ψ `E2[()] : V
(By above equalities)
Ψ ` 〈Σ;π, p : E1[[(!v, c1, c2)1/x2]e2], q : E2[()]〉 : (Φπ, p : U, q : V )
(By rule cons)
Ψ ` 〈Σ;π, p : E1[[(!v, c1, c2)1/x2]e2], q : E2[()]〉 : Φ
(By above equalities)
Ψ′ = Ψ and Φ′ = Φ
(Suppose)




The following lemmas state structural invariants over write effects and read endpoints of
a well-typed configuration: at most one process owns the write token w , and every read
endpoint is a non-duplicable (affine) resource.
Lemma A.10 (Unique writer process). If C is a well-typed configuration with process pool π,
then there exists at most one process in π that owns the write token w (i.e., has w in its
affine context).
Proof. By structural induction over the typing derivation for C. QED.
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Lemma A.11 (Unique reader process). If C is a well-typed configuration with process pool π,
and c is a read endpoint in this configuration, then there exists at most one process in π where
c appears.
Proof. By structural induction over the typing derivation for C. QED.
Theorem A.3 (Single-step confluence). For all well-typed configurations C, if C −→ C1
and C −→ C2 then there exists renaming a function f such that either:
1. C1 = f(C2), or
2. there exists C3 such that C1 −→ C3 and f(C2) −→ C3.
Proof. By induction on the pair of steps 〈C −→ C1 , C −→ C2〉.
We consider the following cases:
Case A.3.1 (Congruence).
If either step uses congr, we apply the inductive hypothesis.
Case A.3.2 (Independent processes).
If both steps advance distinct processes, using any of the rules local, fork and nu, we
produce C3 by combining those two (independent) steps.
Case A.3.3 (One process).
If both steps advance the same process, we show that this is deterministic (up to nam-
ing) by constructing the naming function f such that C2 = f(C1). Most cases are
straightforward since they perform no nondeterministic choices. The only source of
nondeterminism is the name choices, in rules nu and fork. In each case, we map the
name choice from the second step to that of the first step.
Case A.3.4 (Interaction).
If either step uses rw or cw, we rely on Lemmas A.10 and A.11 to show that both steps
use either rw or cw, and that the reader-writer process pair is unique.
QED.
By composing multiple uses of this theorem we prove multi-step confluence. However, to
carry forth this composition, we need a more general notion of single-step confluence, which
is parameteric in a renaming function for the initial configurations.
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Theorem A.4 (Single-step confluence, generalized). For all well-typed configurations C and
renaming functions f , if C −→ C1 and f(C) −→ C2 then there exists renaming function g
such that either:
1. C1 = g(C2), or
2. there exists C3 such that C1 −→ C3 and g(C2) −→ C3.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Theorem A.3 (single-step confluence). QED.
We prove a full confluence theorem that is generalized similarly, by accepting a renaming
function f to produce a new function g:
Theorem A.5 (Full confluence). For all well-typed configurations C, and renaming func-
tions f , if C −→∗ C1 and f(C) −→∗ C2 and C1 term and C2 term then there exists a
renaming function g such that C1 = g(C2).
Proof. By induction on the reduction sequence pair 〈C −→∗ C1 , f(C) −→∗ C2〉. Because
of single-step confluence, we know that if either reduction sequence is empty, then the other
must be empty, and that if either takes a step, the other must take a step.
Case A.5.1 (Empty).
When empty, we have the resulting renaming function g via single-step confluence.
Case A.5.2 (Step).
We consider the case where each reduction consists of at least one step: C −→ C ′1 and
C ′1 −→∗ C1 and f(C) −→ C ′2 and C ′2 −→∗ C2. By single-step confluence, we have that
there exists g0 such that g0(C ′2) = C ′1. By the inductive hypothesis, we have that there
exists g such that C1 = g(C2).
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